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LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD: SARBANES-
OXLEY AND THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Scott Harshbarger* and Goutam U. Jois** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important questions facing American society today 
centers around the role of corporations. Undoubtedly, corporations wield 
a tremendous amount of power in contemporary affairs. For example, 
when Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, Wal-Mart, the world’s 
largest retailer, pledged $1 million on August 30, 2005,1 a full three days 
before government aid arrived.2 While there are surely a variety of 
reactions to that course of events, this particular response highlights our 
country’s reliance on corporate entities for a variety of societal functions 
beyond the “typical” roles of production and employment.3 One of the 
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2002. His current practice focuses in significant part on corporate governance and 
related regulatory matters. 
** J.D. Candidate, Class of 2007, Harvard; M.P.P., A.B., Georgetown; Student Attorney, Harvard 
Legal Aid Bureau.  This Article is the product of several years’ work and would not have been 
possible without the help and input of many different people.  Pablo Eisenberg, a friend and mentor 
to us both, offered comments on earlier drafts of this and a related article.  Thanks to Seth Ragosta, 
Benjamen Brinkert, Danielle Stockley, and Tina Gonzalez for research and editing assistance, and 
to Angela Frontiera for outstanding secretarial assistance on all of our various projects.  We also 
appreciate the support of Murphy, Hesse, Toomey & Lehane, LLP, and Proskauer Rose LLP over 
the years in encouraging this work and providing opportunities to inform the Article with real-world 
experience.  Finally, we would like to thank Prof. Judith Stephenson, Northeastern Law '87; as well 
as Umesh, Indira, Malasa, and Mallika Jois, and Elizabeth Brown, without whose support this 
project would not be possible. 
 1. See, e.g., Parija Bhatnagar, Wal-Mart Closes 123 Stores from Storm, CNNMONEY, Aug. 
31, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/30/news/fortune500/katrina_retailers/. 
 2. See, e.g., Scott Shane, After Failures, Officials Play Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 
2005, at A1. 
 3. See, e.g., E-mail from Don Davenport, Procomm Consulting Group, to authors, (Sept. 2, 
2005, 10:24:07 EDT) (on file with authors) (“We are witnessing the result of years of government 
neglect . . .  What does this say about a nation that turns to WalMart for relief supplies? The 
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biggest questions that comes to the fore when discussing corporations’ 
role is that of corporate governance: how companies are run internally 
and what rules they will play by in the external world.4 
In a narrow sense, good corporate governance means shareholders 
realize value and boards of directors have an easier time fulfilling their 
fiduciary duties. More broadly, corporate governance is about the 
principles that underlie democracy: transparency, checks and balances, 
and accountability.5 Good corporate governance means that businesses 
recognize the duties that correspond to the privileges that society has 
granted them: favorable tax treatment, limited liability, and so forth. 
When scandals strike the public or nonprofit sectors, there is often a loud 
call for accountability, ethics, and integrity, and rightly so. This is 
rationalized on the grounds that these entities receive public funding, 
subsidies, tax-exemptions and other related benefits. However, as the 
Katrina story indicates and as scholars have discussed,6 corporations 
 
spokesm[e]n for WalMart and Lo[ew]s w[ere] on TV sending relief supplies before the President of 
the United States.”). 
 4. Corporate governance is “[i]n essence . . . the structure that is intended to make sure that 
the right questions get asked and that checks and balances are in place to make sure that the answers 
reflect what is best for the creation of long-term, sustainable value.” ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL 
MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (3d ed. 2004). The primary participants are (1) the 
shareholders, (2) the management (led by the executive officer), and (3) the board of directors. Id. at 
6.   
 5. Another article makes the analogy to democracy more forcefully. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, 
and Andrew Metrick write: 
Corporations are republics. The ultimate authority rests with voters (shareholders). These 
voters elect representatives (directors) who delegate most decisions to bureaucrats 
(managers). As in any republic, the actual power-sharing relationship depends upon the 
specific rules of governance. One extreme, which tilts toward a democracy, reserves 
little power for management and allows shareholders to quickly and easily replace 
directors. The other extreme, which tilts toward a dictatorship, reserves extensive power 
for management and places strong restrictions on shareholders’ ability to replace 
directors. 
Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 107 (2003). 
  The connection between corporate governance and democracy in the abstract sometimes 
has real political implications in practice. Gretchen Morgenson reports that the issue of executive 
pay at two major utility companies is affecting the campaigns for political office in Illinois. 
Gretchen Morgenson, Executive Pay Becomes Political, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2006, § 3, at 1. 
Gubernatorial candidates are promising to try to renew the freeze on electricity rates to assist 
consumers and prevent companies from using new stock plans to “capture a windfall from the rate 
increase” for executives. Id. Mark Hulbert writes that a new study strongly suggests that companies 
that make political contributions to the most Congressional candidates enjoy better performance in 
stocks and experience “faster subsequent growth in their profitability” than companies that 
contribute to fewer candidates. Mark Hulbert, The Share-Price-to-Campaign-Contribution Ratio, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2006, § 3, at 6. 
 6. See, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of 
Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 120 n.465 (2004) (discussing the 
2
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play a significant role in society as well. Arguably, corporations exert 
more influence and play a greater role in our daily lives than other 
governmental or social institutions. Accordingly, we should be even 
more concerned about good corporate governance. 
Corporate governance recently tends to bring to mind the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”).7 SOX was passed in response to the 
corporate scandals of the early 2000s (particularly Enron and 
WorldCom).8 The Act has garnered much attention, as it represents the 
most sweeping and comprehensive overhaul of federal corporate 
governance law since the securities laws of 1933 and 1934.9 In the 
intervening four years commentators from all walks of political, legal 
and academic life have considered its utility.10 Corporate governance 
remains a timely issue. Recent class action and bankruptcy legislation, 
continued earnings restatements and accounting scandals, new 
regulations and investigations of hedge funds and mutual funds, white-
collar criminal prosecutions, and recently-finalized settlements, fines, 
 
influence that corporations have in society and in particular on regulations); cf. GEORGE J. STIGLER, 
MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 115-118 (1988) (noting the “actual effects of 
economic regulations” and arguing that the regulations actually served the interests of firms and 
industries, not the public interest). 
 7. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amendment in scattered sections of 15, 18 
U.S.C.) [hereinafter SOX]. 
 8. SOX was first introduced on February 14, 2002 and was signed into law on July 30th, 
2002. Id. The SEC began investigating Enron in October, 2001 and WorldCom in March of 2002. 
See Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES, Aug. 26, 2002, 
http://www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html  [hereinafter Timeline]; Timeline of 
Enron Collapse, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A25624-2002Jan10; The Rise and Fall of WorldCom, 
USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/telecom/2002-07-21-worldcom-
chronology_x.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2006). 
 9. See, e.g., Press Release, President George W. Bush, President Bush Signs Corporate 
Corruption Bill (July 30, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2002/07/20020730.html (describing SOX as “the most far-reaching reforms of American business 
practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt). 
 10. See, e.g., Sarita Mohanty, Sarbanes-Oxley: Can One Model Fit All?, 12 NEW ENG. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 231 (2006); Joseph F. Morrissey, Catching the Culprits: Is Sarbanes-Oxley 
Enough?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801 (2003); Susan J. Stabile, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Rules of 
Professional Responsibility Viewed Through a Sextonian Lens, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 31 
(2004); Timothy L. Weston, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Under Siege: Solutions for Solving the 
Problems of Implementing Section 404, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 86 (2006); Erica Gann, 
Comment, Judicial Action In Retrograde: The Case For Applying Section 804 Of The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act To All Fraud Actions Under The Securities Laws, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1043 (2004); 
Jennifer S. Recine, Note, Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535 (2002); Michael D. Silberfarb, Note, Justifying 
Punishment For White-Collar Crime: A Utilitarian And Retributive Analysis Of The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 95 (2003). 
3
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and penalties all indicate that the corporate governance landscape is still 
unsettled.11 What balance will be struck in the relationship between 
corporations and other basic societal institutions? The answer remains 
uncertain. 
Importantly, perhaps most important to shareholders, we now know 
that Enron and WorldCom were not just the work of a few “bad apples.” 
We have seen story after story of corporate malfeasance over the past 
four years.12 As a result even honest, ethical CEOs are finding it harder 
to compete in the marketplace.13 Instead of embracing responsibilities to 
all of their stakeholders,14 too many corporate leaders try to shirk their 
obligations and get away with doing as little as possible.15 
 
 11. 2005 saw the passage of new class action and bankruptcy legislation. Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
28 U.S.C.A); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.A.). There was also a 
multitude of earnings restatements. A sampling includes the Bermuda-based insurance company 
Ace; Taser International, which makes stun guns; Kanebo, a Japanese cosmetics company; 
CharterMac, a real estate finance company; ConAgra, one of the country’s largest food companies; 
and Eastman Kodak, the photography company. See Joseph B. Treaster, Ace to Restate 5 Years of 
Earnings to Correct Accounting, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2005, at C4; Stun Gun Maker to Restate 2004 
Earnings, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2005, at C12; Todd Zaun, Cosmetics Maker Restates Earnings, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2005, at C5; Tax Errors Force ConAgra to Restate Earnings, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 25, 2005, at C13; Kodak to Restate Some Earnings for Accounting Errors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
17, 2005, at C3. Hedge funds were subject to regulation under the Investment Advisers Act as of 
February 1, 2006, see 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2 (2005), until that regulation was struck down, see 
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The SEC promulgated rules requiring mutual 
funds boards to have an independent chairman and also have at least three-fourths of their directors 
be independent. See SEC Release No. IC-26520, “Investment Company Governance” (July 27, 
2004); see also 17 C.F.R. Part 270.0-1(a)(7)(i), (iv) (describing the three-fourths rule and the 
independent chairman requirement, respectively). However, that rule, too, was recently struck down 
for failing to comply with requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006). For a discussion of relatively 
recent indictments over tax and accounting fraud, see infra notes 93-96. By the end of the 2006, the 
“McNulty Memo” had restrained government prosecutors, the SEC had promulgated a more lenient 
rule regarding Section 404 compliance for small firms, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for 
Organizations were revised in light of corporations’ concerns. See infra notes 64-72 and 
accompanying text. In short, the landscape keeps changing at rapid pace — this Article will surely 
be outdated by the time it is printed — and the issue remains timely. 
 12. See generally Timeline, supra note 8. 
 13. See, e.g., Ken Belson, WorldCom’s Audacious Failure and Its Toll on an Industry, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at C1 (discussing the impact of WorldCom’s malfeasance on its competitors). 
 14. See, e.g., Chen & Hanson, supra note 6, at 34-35 (discussing the question of 
“stakeholder” obligations and whether corporations have obligations to non-shareholder 
constituencies); see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV 733 (2005). Corporate managers should have the discretion, but not a duty, to 
sacrifice some amount of profits in the name of the public interest. See id. at 743. 
 15. Conversely, when it comes to lining their own pockets, they are trying to get away with 
doing as much as possible. See infra Part IVB (discussing clawbacks). President Bush recently 
criticized business executives for excessive compensation.  See Jim Rutenberg, Bush Tells Wall St. 
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Those charged with enforcing laws against corporations, primarily 
Attorneys General, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
and the Department of Justice, have their hands full aggressively 
investigating corporations, a situation that has led to antagonism. For 
example, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer has extracted 
settlements from corporations on a regular basis, to significant 
criticism.16 William Donaldson, former Chairman of the SEC, was 
regarded as anti-business because he pushed through aggressive 
regulations of corporations, mutual funds and others, even though he 
was appointed by President George W. Bush, a Republican.17 
Christopher Cox has vowed to follow in Donaldson’s footsteps, 
continuing the application of clear and consistently enforced rules.18 
We argue that this antagonism is unnecessarily combative and 
counterproductive. Recent developments in corporate law illustrate a 
few major themes. First, regulators have woken up to the prevalence of 
corporate fraud and malfeasance. SOX was passed as a reaction to a few 
salient examples of corporate crime, but its proactive applicability and 
its potential lie in preventing such crime in the future.19 Second, this 
 
to Rethink Pay Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at C11. President Bush made the point that 
executives’ pay should be based on increasing shareholder value and that investor trust is critical to 
the success of American markets. See id. The President’s call sounds a common theme, but we 
should not lose sight of the fact that reform is not an end in itself. Trust in markets matters, but only 
to the extent that ethical conduct fosters trust. If investors regain trust in markets, only to get 
hoodwinked again, we will know that businesses lead to build more than just “trust.” 
 16. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Maybe Spitzer’s Cape Was Too Big, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, § 
3, at 4 (discussing Spitzer’s strategy of bringing charges and then negotiating a settlement, and 
praising a Bank of America broker for fighting the charges and getting acquitted). For a general 
discussion of Spitzer’s various enforcement and prosecution efforts, see Michael Luo, Spitzer 
Makes Push for New Laws to Help Punish Medicaid Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2005, at B3; Jeff 
Leeds, Sony BMG Called Close to Settlement with Spitzer, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2005, at C1; Eric 
Dash, Spitzer Says Banks Are Resisting Inquiry on Lending Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at 
C2. 
 17. See, e.g., Joseph Nocera, Starting Off by Doing Right on Options, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 
2005, at C1 (describing former Chairman Donaldson as a “zealous regulator” and Donaldson’s 
successor as “the anti-Donaldson, a pro-business California Republican”). 
 18. Chris Cox, Congressman, Nomination Speech (June 2, 2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050602-4.html. 
 19. Indeed, one unintended positive consequence of SOX was the revelation of stock option 
scandals. SOX requires more timely disclosure so grants are harder to hide. Previously, executives 
could disclose stock option grants as late as thirteen months after the grant itself; SOX has lowered 
that time frame to forty-eight hours. An extensive statistical study of option grants from 1992 to 
2002 revealed that executives either “possessed truly extraordinary abilities to forecast precise 
overall market movements” or were “backdating the grants.” Geoffrey Colvin, A Study in CEO 
Greed, FORTUNE, June 12, 2006, at 53. After SOX’s new reporting requirement, “backdating 
virtually disappears.” Id. Colvin’s article was citing the groundbreaking study by Erik Lie at the 
University of Iowa. See Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MANAGEMENT 
SCI. 802 (2005) available at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/Grants-MS.pdf. See also David 
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regulation is here to stay. There is enough support from groups like 
institutional investors and regulators to ensure that SOX will continue 
for some time. Indeed, the debates today center on how much of SOX 
should be relaxed, not (generally) whether the law should be scrapped 
altogether.20 Moreover, the steady stream of corporate fraud revelations 
(recently, for example, with accounting issues at Fannie Mae21 and 
options backdating at Apple22) indicates that rolling back regulation 
would be the wrong move at the wrong time. 
Simultaneously, however, it is smart politics to recognize that 
corporate interests have been particularly well-received in today’s 
political climate. One group led by Hal Scott of Harvard Law School 
and another led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce have been influential 
in calling for a relaxation of SOX requirements, particularly in the 
context of small firms.23 Thus, any proposals to modify existing 
corporate governance or securities laws should aim to work with 
business leaders and not merely try to regulate them into submission, if 
such a thing were even possible. 
In this Article, we argue that all groups: business leaders, regulators 
and shareholders, should recognize the steps that must be taken to create 
a competitive, fair and ethical corporate climate.24 We are not calling 
merely for “voluntary cooperation” from businesses to improve the 
 
Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 
449 (1997); David Henry, A Sarbox Surprise: The New Requirements are Slowing Options Tricks, 
BUS. WK., June 12, 2006, at 38. This is one of the rarely-discussed benefits of SOX. Another 
important benefit has been the revelation of accounting irregularities, malicious and otherwise, at 
smaller firms. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (discussing how SOX, and Section 
404 in particular, have subjected smaller firms to scrutiny for the first time, and how in many that 
scrutiny is revealing misconduct). 
 20. See, e.g., Mark A. Stein, Airlines, Now Healthy, Getting Frisky, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
2006, at C2. But see William A. Niskanen, Enron’s Last Victim: American Markets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 3, 2007, at A21 (arguing that “[a]s Senator Sarbanes and Representative Oxley drift into 
retirement, their act should retire with them”). 
 21. Eric Dash, Regulators Denounce Fannie Mae, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2006, at C1. 
 22. John Markoff & Eric Dash, Apple Panel on Options Backs Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 
2006, at C1 (describing the investigation into options manipulation at Apple and concluding that ex-
executives were at fault, not current CEO Steven P. Jobs). 
 23. See infra notes 138-47 (highlighting the activities of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce-led 
group). 
 24. The word “ethical” is important here. As we have pointed out in a related piece, an ethical 
dilemma is not deciding whether to break the law. An ethical dilemma arises when one could make 
the wrong decision within the bounds of the law. See Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, 
Deterring White Collar Crime, BOSTON BUS. J., Aug. 19-25, 2005, at 47; see also Damon Darlin, 
Adviser Urges H.P. to Focus On Ethics Over Legalities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2006, at C3 (describing 
the preliminary conclusion of the outside lawyer asked to review H.P.’s investigations policy, that 
“it was ethics, not the law, that needed to be paid more heed”). 
6
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current situation. Indeed, SOX exists and is appropriate for this situation 
precisely because it imposes baseline obligations with which 
corporations are required to comply. Moreover, other regulations 
regarding independent directors, expensing of stock options, etc. are 
needed and are vital to keeping business interests in line with society’s. 
However, business leaders and regulators will have an easier time 
promoting a healthy marketplace if industry gets “ahead of the curve.” In 
the end, business leaders must do just that by leading and implementing 
broad mechanisms of self-regulation and monitoring. Most important, 
the changes that need to be made are neither radical nor difficult. 
Executives and regulators must adopt common-sense reforms. Through 
proactive regulation, public officials should create and align 
corporations’ incentives so that they can then find market solutions to 
governance issues. Business leaders, regulators and citizens can work 
together to create a climate of corporate integrity. 
Business leaders should: 
• Conduct independent audits of governance structures, 
focusing on ethical conduct, 
• Enact aggressive “clawback” provisions to keep CEOs 
accountable, 
• Empower boards of directors to properly serve shareholders’ 
interests, 
• Recognize that “doing well” involves “doing good,” and 
• Use independent professionals as ballast to corporate leaders. 
 
Regulators should: 
• Recognize and reduce the high compliance costs on small- 
and mid-sized firms, 
• Allow differently-situated firms to adopt different 
compliance procedures, 
• Provide amnesty to companies that disclose wrongdoing up 
front, and 
• Prosecute as a means toward an end, not as an end in itself. 
 
Citizens and investors should: 
• Demand good governance from the companies they invest in, 
even when markets are doing well. 
7
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II.  THE SITUATION TODAY 
A.  Contemporary Background 
The most important thing to note about recent corporate scandals is 
that they have continued unabated since the crisis in the early 2000s. 
Enron was just the tip of the iceberg: there was much more fraud, and it 
infected companies of all sizes in all industries. A sample of corporate 
scandals for everything from insider trading to outright theft includes 
ImClone (2001), Tyco (2002), WorldCom (2002), Adelphia (2002), 
HealthSouth (2002), Qwest (2002), NYSE (2003), Parmalat (2003), 
Marsh and McLennan (2004), AIG (2005), Krispy Kreme (2005), and 
Fannie Mae (2006), to name a few.25 Wall Street did not escape 
unscathed, with Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan, Citigroup, and many other 
Wall Street brokerages all under investigation at some point for 
everything from illegal trading to conflicts of interest.26 The mutual fund 
scandals particularly brought small investor and middle class attention to 
the dangers and costs of poor governance.27 Politicians and 
governmental entities can no longer afford the appearance of being soft 
on corporate excess, and corporations are likely to feel the sting of an 
angry public as well. 
Shareholder activism has even pressured those indirectly involved 
in malfeasance. For example, J.P. Morgan reached a $1 billion 
settlement with Enron after the energy giant sued the bank, saying that 
J.P. Morgan contributed to the company’s spectacular bankruptcy.28 The 
SEC separately charged the banks with being complicit in the fraud, 
adding hundreds of millions more dollars to the disgorgements, fines, 
 
 25  See, e.g., Timeline, supra note 8 (referencing scandals at Authur Anderson, Enron, Quest  
Communications International, Tyco, WorldCom, Adelphia, and Xerox); Francesca di Meglio, 
Inside the Parmalat Scandal: What You Need to Know?, ITALIANSRUS.COM, Dec. 28, 2003, 
http://www.italiansrus.com/articles/ourpaesani/parmalat.htm (discussing the Parmalat scandal); 
Greenberg Out, AIG Stock Sinks, CNNMONEY, Mar. 15, 2005, 
http://money.cnn.com/2005/03/15/news/fortune500/aig/index.htm (discussing the AIG scandal); 
Rick Brooks, Krispy Kreme Ousts Six Executives, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2005, at B3  (discussing the 
Krispy Kreme scandal); Dash, supra note 21 (discussing the Fannie Mae scandal). 
 26. Gretchen Morgenson & Patrick McGeehan, Corporate Conduct: The Overview: Wall 
Street Firms ready to pay $1 billion in fines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at A1. 
 27. Claudia H. Deutsch, Revolt of the Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, § 3, at 1 
(describing how shareholders have demanded governance reforms at some of the largest companies, 
including Wal-Mart, GE, and Citigroup). 
 28. See, e.g., Julie Creswell, J.P. Morgan and Toronto-Dominion Agree to Settle Suits in 
Enron Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2005, at C3; Press Release, JP Morgan Chase, JP Morgan 
Chase Announces Settlement with Enron (Aug. 16, 2005), available at 
http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/press/releaseDetail.cfm?ReleaseID=171010. 
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and penalties paid.29 
Of course, this does not imply that all corporate executives, board 
members, and officers are ill-intentioned or even of dubious moral 
character. Many well-meaning business leaders are simply confused by a 
regulatory environment that is in flux, imposes costs, and poorly 
articulates what benefits, if any, accrue to the corporation.30 Other 
business leaders might want to act but are unsure how, since they are 
under the constant scrutiny of regulators, auditors, and lawyers. The 
slightest misstep, even if done in good faith, can cost billions of dollars. 
Indeed, it is possible that not one of the executives of Enron, WorldCom, 
or any other now-vilified company set out to do evil. Instead, they were 
tempted to “fudge,” time and again, until a mere white lie became 
outright fraud.31 The “choices” that these individuals made were not 
choices as we commonly think of them, but decisions that were 
significantly constrained by the strong situational pressures that the 
market and its profit motive exerted.32  
Take the example of Bernard Ebbers, the former CEO of 
WorldCom. In August 2005, he was sentenced to twenty-five years in 
prison for his role in the company’s demise.33 Yet while he was 
presiding over an eleven-billion dollar fraud,34 Ebbers was very well-
respected in the community for his generosity; he was a Sunday school 
 
 29. See SEC Charges J.P. Morgan Chase in Connection with Enron’s Accounting Fraud, 
Litigation Release No. 18252, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1820, 80 SEC 
Docket 2286 (July 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18252.htm; see 
also SEC Charges Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and Three Executives with Aiding and 
Abetting Enron’s Accounting Fraud, Litigation Release No. 18517, Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release No. 1932, 81 SEC Docket 3038 (Dec. 22, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18517.htm. 
 30. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, A New Mood in Congress to Forgo Corporate Scrutiny, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at C3 [hereinafter Labaton, New Mood] (discussing the push by businesses to 
rollback all or part of Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 31. See, e.g., E-mail from Frank A. Nicolai to authors (July 14, 2005, 22:49 EDT) (on file 
with authors) (“I do not believe that any of the CEOs . . . intended from the start to engage in 
fraudulent conduct . . . No, these people started down the slippery slope when they felt the pressure 
from adverse results . . . so they thought it [okay] to fudge a little . . . ”). 
 32. See infra Part III (discussing the importance of situation in the corporate context). For an 
overview of how we are affected by situational forces, see generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, 
The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, 
and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003) and Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The 
Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004) 
(both describing the influence of situational forces on individuals’ decisions and in particular the 
situational pressures of markets). 
 33. See, Carrie Johnson, Ebbers Gets 25-Year Sentence For Role in WorldCom Fraud, WASH. 
POST, July 14, 2005, at A1 (noting also that WorldCom’s bankruptcy was the largest in U.S. 
history). 
 34. Id. 
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teacher and donated millions to local causes.35 This is not to excuse the 
decisions of Ebbers or anyone else; their actions, while perhaps 
understandable, are wrong. It should teach us that the solution to the 
corporate governance problem is in one sense simple: instead of asking 
how to “rehabilitate” these “bad actors,” we should think about how to 
realign incentives and obligations so that the situational pressures push 
directors and officers to do the right thing. 
As one of us knows from decades of experience in law 
enforcement, the importance of these incentives cannot be understated. 
Some small number of people, in Corporate America or elsewhere, will 
set out to break the law and will do so regardless of the regulatory 
environment. Another small number will do the right thing, again 
regardless of the prevailing winds. The overwhelming majority, 
however, takes its cues from the external situation. A weak regulatory 
response provides incentives for this large majority to skirt the law, 
while a strong response encourages proper conduct, even without 
prosecuting every instance of malfeasance. A social consensus around 
positive governance promises much greater results than individual 
policing could ever hope to accomplish. 
B.  The Role of Regulation 
The role and nature of regulation depends critically on public and 
political opinion regarding corporate governance. When strategizing for 
the future, what executives should take from today’s corporate landscape 
is that the subjects of corporate ethics and governance are most 
definitely on the radar screen. As we have noted earlier,36 the continuing 
debate over SOX, recent rules regarding hedge funds and mutual funds, 
and class action and bankruptcy legislation all illuminate issues 
regarding the relationship between government and business. Moreover, 
Senator Sarbanes and Representative Oxley have announced their 
resignations from Congress, and some believe the loss of these venerable 
advocates of the law will adversely affect its future.37 Will these forces 
culminate in a pro-industry revision of SOX that rolls back regulation? 
Already, two committees are proposing revisions to SOX, hoping to 
loosen regulation by introducing “broad new protections to corporations 
and accounting firms against criminal cases brought by federal and state 
prosecutors as well as a stronger shield against civil lawsuits from 
 
 35. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Fraud’s Many Helpers, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2005, at B1. 
 36. See supra note 11. 
 37. And some hope that it will. See Niskanen, supra note 20. 
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investors.”38 
Such a revision would be deleterious for the long-term prospects of 
creating an ethical corporate culture. Strong regulatory mechanisms are 
needed to establish a baseline of conduct for business leaders.39 Such 
regulation not only penalizes wrongdoing but also protects those who act 
properly. Without a regulatory baseline, well-governed companies are 
worse off for their competitors’ wrongdoing. For example, WorldCom’s 
fraudulent activity affected the entire telecommunications industry, as 
competitors struggled to match WorldCom’s fictitious profits and 
prices.40 In such a situation, everyone suffers: not only the managers and 
executives who are unable to run their companies as well as they 
mistakenly thought WorldCom was, but also employees who lose their 
jobs and consumers who are left with a fragmented and unstable 
telecommunications industry.41 
The loud advocacy against reform comes as many are calling for 
continued reform with equal vigor. And those yelling the loudest for 
reform are not radicals from the far left — they are mutual fund 
managers, institutional investors, and others in the mainstream business 
world.42 Law firms, too, are emphasizing their experience in the 
corporate governance field; plaintiffs’ firms are pushing for corporate 
responsibility and accountability,43 while corporate defense firms tout 
their counseling and litigation expertise.44 And there is evidence that, at 
least in some corners, those calls for a more transparent, ethical culture 
are being heeded. For example, Yahoo! Finance recently started 
 
 38. Stephen Labaton, Businesses Seek New Protection on Legal Front, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 
2006, § 1, at 1 [hereinafter Labaton, Businesses Seek New Protection]. See infra notes 135-47. 
 39. But see Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A 
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 3, 18-61 (2003) (arguing against 
regulatory responses to corporate fraud and suggesting that market mechanisms are best suited to 
improve corporate governance). 
 40.  See Belson, supra note 13. 
 41.  Id. 
 42. See, e.g., Troy Wolverton, Shareholders Flex Muscles, THESTREET.COM, June 2, 2005, 
http://www.thestreet.com/pf/stocks/troywolverton/10226152.html; Gretchen Morgenson, Sometimes 
Investors Should Just Say No, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, § 3, at 1. 
 43. See, e.g., Milberg Weiss, Why Milberg Weiss, http://www.milbergweiss.com/ 
whymilberg/whymilberg.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2005) (describing the firm’s “unique position to 
vigorously pursue all types of corporate wrongdoing”). It is worth noting that Milberg Weiss itself 
has been indicted for allegedly illegal (and unethical) conduct. See Martha Neil, Milberg Weiss on 
the Hot Seat, A.B.A. J.  (Dec. 2006) at 34. 
 44. At risk of self-promotion, see, for example, Proskauer Rose, Proskauer Rose LLP – 
Corporate Governance/Corporate Defense, http://www.proskauer.com/practice_areas/areas/093 (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2006) (describing the firm’s ability to identify problems, work in appropriate internal 
investigation and deploy defensive strategies). 
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including a “Corporate Governance Quotient” on its company profile 
webpages; now investors can have governance information at hand 
while evaluating stocks.45 Senior executives at top companies have been 
dismissed over ethical lapses, even in profitable times.46 The seeds of 
good corporate ethics are starting to grow, albeit slowly. Nevertheless, 
the sprouts are fragile and can be destroyed with the slightest wrong 
move. 
C.  Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations 
It is worth pausing to provide a more concrete example of the 
general suggestions we have made thus far. In other words, how exactly 
can we nurture these sprouts? How can regulation facilitate the 
development of an ethical corporate culture? 
The 2004 amendments to Chapter Eight of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines provide a good starting point.47 Chapter Eight is commonly 
referred to as the “Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations,” or 
FSGOs. The FSGOs articulate many of the same themes that we have 
mentioned. For example, an organization can qualify for a downward 
departure at sentencing if it had an effective compliance and ethics 
program (“ECEP”).48 An ECEP must, inter alia, “promote an 
organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment 
to compliance with the law.”49 Moreover, organizations are rewarded for 
self-reporting, cooperating with authorities, and accepting responsibility 
for wrongdoing.50 The FSGOs recognize the need for cooperation 
between businesses and regulators, and shift the emphasis to preventing 
criminal misconduct rather than merely punishing it.51 
The FSGO example also illustrates how the dialogue between 
business leaders and regulators can progress. For example, the 
 
 45. See, e.g., Yahoo! Finance, Profile for Yahoo Inc., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=YHOO 
(last visited July 14, 2005) (providing “quotes and info” for Yahoo, Inc., including a Corporate 
Governance Quotient). 
 46. See, e.g., Landon Thomas, Jr., On Wall Street, a Rise in Dismissals Over Ethics, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2005, at A1. 
 47. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (2006) (amended version at 2006 Supp. to 
App. C, amdt. 673) [hereinafter USSG]. 
 48. Id. at § 8C2.5(f)(1). 
 49. Id. at § 8B2.1. 
 50. Id. at § 8C2.5(g). 
 51. This is particularly important because it is impossible to prosecute every instance of 
wrongdoing. If the real goal is deterrence, and not merely prosecution for its own sake, regulators 
must create incentives for business leaders to do the right thing. In many cases, this would include 
the threat of prosecution and punishment, but it should also include rewards for good faith efforts to 
comply with the law. 
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Association for Corporate Counsel (“ACC”) identifies several 
shortcomings with the FSGOs in a 2005 white paper,52 but the paper 
makes strides in acknowledging, and working within, the spirit of the 
amendments. For example, the FSGOs require companies to report any 
evidence of wrongdoing to the government within a reasonable time.53 
The ACC instead recommends that the company either report such 
wrongdoing or develop and implement modifications to the company’s 
practices to remedy the situation.54 
The merits of the ACC proposal are open to question. It is true that 
implementing strong practices to remedy wrongdoing is more important 
than merely reporting it. The converse concern is that a lack of reporting 
encourages cover-ups and deceit. We take up this issue later.55 For now, 
our intention is merely to point out that the ACC letter represents a type 
of dialogue, and it is precisely this type of dialogue between business 
and government leaders that is needed to foster developments in the 
spirit of good governance and competition.56 
Another concern of the ACC and others regarded the waiver of 
attorney-client privilege.57 The ACC worried that “provisions now 
codified in Chapter 8 . . . would make waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege almost a certainty in order for a charged company to be 
deemed ‘cooperative,’ and thus eligible for more lenient treatment in 
settlement discussions or at sentencing.”58 A flashpoint for this 
controversy was the so-called Thompson Memo, written in 2003 by 
then-Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson.59 Corporations were 
concerned that the Thompson Memo effectively required, inter alia, 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege, even though the memo wrote that 
 
 52. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: What’s Up, ASS’N OF CORP. 
COUNSEL, Feb. 2005, available at https://www.acca.com/protected/article/attyclient/sentencing.pdf 
(on file with authors) [hereinafter ACC Letter]. 
 53. USSG § 8C2.5(f)(2). 
 54. ACC Letter, supra note 52, at 12. 
 55. See infra Part IV (discussing what steps regulators should take). 
 56. Another good example of the way our argument would work in practice regards recent 
regulation relating to expensing stock options. See our discussion of this subject in Part V below. 
 57. ACC Letter, supra note 52, at 1. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General to Heads of 
Department Components and U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memo]. The Thompson Memo has come 
under heavy criticism from corporations. Judge Kaplan, of the Southern District of New York, 
recently chastised prosecutors’ heavy-handed tactics on a related matter. See infra note 61. Yet, 
overzealous prosecutors aside, it should be noted that the memo, by its terms, does not require such 
action. The prosecutors seem to be affected by the aggressive, antagonistic environment; it is our 
view that changing that environment will change the way prosecutors see their roles. 
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waiver requests should be limited to “factual internal investigation[s]” 
and emphasized that waiving privilege is not an “absolute requirement” 
for being deemed compliant.60 Though this position is not ideal from 
ACC’s perspective, it showed at least some degree of flexibility on the 
part of the DOJ. Moreover, when prosecutors’ tactics in implementing 
the provisions of the Thompson Memo became increasingly 
overreaching, they were rebuffed by the courts.61 Thus the judicial 
branch can step in to play a role in the dialogue we envision.62 
The dialogue is in many ways ongoing. The FSGOs were revised 
effective November 1, 2006; the new version deletes the reference to 
waiver of attorney-client privilege in the section regarding culpability 
score.63 
Discontent over the Thompson Memo grew to such a pitch that the 
Department of Justice issued a revision of the documents, now dubbed 
the “McNulty Memo.”64 The McNulty Memo emphasizes that 
prosecutors “may only request waiver of attorney-client or work product 
protections when there is a legitimate need for the privileged information 
to fulfill their law enforcement obligations. A legitimate need for the 
information is not established by concluding it is merely desirable or 
convenient to obtain privileged information.”65 Prosecutors’ requests for 
waiver now require approval from several supervisors before a 
corporation may be asked,66 and (presumably in response to Judge 
Kaplan) when deciding if a company should be indicted, prosecutors are 
instructed not to consider whether the company is paying employees’ 
attorneys’ fees.67 All of these changes make strides toward requests 
made by corporations, although some argue the memo does not go far 
enough.68 
Indeed, in writing the memo, McNulty was careful to point out that 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of the Southern District of New York issued a scathing opinion in 
which he criticized prosecutors’ tactics in the aftermath of the Thompson Memo. See United States 
v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d. 330, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Compare USSG § 8C2.5(g), cmt. 12 (Nov. 1, 2005) with USSG § 8C2.5(g), cmt. 12 (Nov. 
1, 2006). The latter deletes the reference to waiver. 
 64. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General to Heads of Department 
Components and U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/ 
2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memo]. 
 65. Id. at 8 - 9. 
 66. Id. at 9-10. 
 67. Id. at 11. 
 68. See, e.g., Martha Neil, Thompson Memo Changes Not Enough, ABA Says, ABA J. E-
REPORT, Dec. 15, 2006, at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/d15specter.html. 
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“the fundamental principles that have guided [the DOJ’s] enforcement 
practices are sound.”69  The memo ostensibly did not change any of the 
underlying principles of prosecution or enforcement; instead, it merely 
clarified the role that waiver and payment of fees should play in 
determining whether a corporation was cooperating with regulatory 
authorities.70 We agree with the McNulty Memo that the fundamental 
enforcement principles are sound. More than anything else, the McNulty 
Memo sends a signal to prosecutors that they should exercise better 
judgment and restraint in their work, and to this extent, we applaud it. 
However, we are concerned that this, the FSGO amendments, and the 
SEC’s new relaxation of SOX requirements71 are not the product of a 
dialogue between groups, but rather the first step of many in rolling back 
regulation. If it is in fact the latter, we are very concerned.72 
Both the private and public sectors have been given a brief window 
of opportunity. The salience of business issues in public policy and the 
ability of businesses to influence that policy means that corporate 
viewpoints are heard with unusual clarity. Simultaneously, the continued 
focus on good governance means we are facing a new reality, and that 
reality is here to stay. The puzzle lies in determining how to harness this 
opportunity for the benefit of businesses, regulators and citizens and to 
create a sustained, healthy and strong culture of corporate responsibility. 
III.  CHANGING THE CORPORATE CULTURE 
In its credo, Johnson & Johnson says that it will “bear [its] fair 
share of taxes.”73 This seemingly simple statement reveals a lot about the 
 
 69. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General to Heads of Department 
Components and U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006), at 1, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/ 
speech/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf (two-page accompanying memorandum preceding McNulty 
Memo). 
 70. See McNulty Memo, supra note 64. 
 71. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. 
 72. As an aside, it is interesting to ask why we say the company did not have a choice in the 
waiver or fees context. Judge Kaplan calls this a decision made with the “proverbial gun to the 
head.” See infra note 223. After all, they could just waive and get the credit, or not waive and accept 
the consequences. Of course, this is a classic example of where choices are not really free and 
constrained by situation. But what about elsewhere? Seeing the situational influences that affect 
some (corporations) but not others (prosecutors) sheds light on whose perspective we take in a given 
dispute. See id. (referencing Jon Hanson, who has made this point in a variety of contexts). We 
would do well to pause and ask why we take the corporation’s perspective here, as opposed to the 
prosecutor’s, when the prosecutors ostensibly are representing the public interest, not private 
interests. 
 73. Johnson & Johnson, Our Credo, http://www.jnj.com/our_company/our_credo (last visited 
July 14, 2005). 
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nature of corporate America. While all companies (and individuals, for 
that matter) seek to minimize their tax burden, taxes are nonetheless seen 
as a routine part of doing business. Similarly, directors, managers, 
executives, and employees must come to see ethical governance as part 
of doing business, not as something outside the system that they need to 
defend against. 
This, of course, requires a shift in corporate culture, one that will 
not be easy to accomplish. But the first steps are relatively self-
explanatory. After all, contemporary financial scandals often do not 
involve complicated legal or financial maneuverings.74 This is low-
hanging fruit, and when regulators see it they start to get hungry. 
Corporations fear this and have criticized regulators like Eliot Spitzer for 
going after companies too aggressively.75 Spitzer may have been 
aggressive, but his attacks were brought on by the prevalence and 
audacity of corporate malfeasance. 
We use the term low-hanging fruit to mean two things. First, these 
are easy targets for regulators. Second, and more important, these 
instances of malfeasance are easy for business leaders to fix. It seems 
that a typical reaction in a variety of regulated industries is to try and 
“outlast” a regulator. Instead of trying to see if they can just outlast the 
next aggressive regulator to come down the pike, directors and officers 
should get ahead of the curve and start thinking about how to meet 
regulators’ goals and add shareholder value. 
For example, President Bush appointed Christopher Cox to succeed 
Donaldson as Chairman of the SEC.76 Cox’s nomination prompted 
speculation as to whether Chairman Cox will be “pro-business” or “anti-
business.”77 While an article noted his “long record . . . of promoting the 
agenda of business interests,” a prominent plaintiffs’ lawyer said, “It’s 
hard to think of a worse choice for the S.E.C.”78 These are simply the 
wrong points. If businesses and regulators recognize their common goal, 
an ethical, competitive, corporate culture, the entire frame of inquiry 
shifts. For example, regulators will not need to “crack down” if 
businesses take the lead in changing the corporate culture. Businesses 
 
 74. There are some who argue that Enron’s actions were not illegal, but merely complicated. 
See Malcom Gladwell, Open Secrets: Enron, Intelligence, and the Perils of too much Information, 
THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 8, 2007, at 44. Joe Nocera has strongly refuted this position. See Joe 
Nocera, Tipping Over a Defense of Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2007, at C1. 
 75. See, e.g., Sorkin, supra note 16. 
 76. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Bush S.E.C. Pick Is Seen as Friend to Corporations, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 3, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter Labaton, Bush SEC Pick]. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (quoting William Learch). 
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will not feel threatened by the SEC if they work proactively with the 
agency in crafting rules in the future.79  Businesses should see the value 
of such cooperation because well-managed firms take the brunt of the 
injury when others act poorly. The goal should not be to maximize 
prosecutions or minimize regulations; instead, the goal should be to 
foster the kind of environment in which ethical conduct is rewarded. 
These conflicts between personal and professional gain on the one 
hand and ethical behavior on the other must be recognized and 
addressed. They must be recognized by corporations because the market 
is best-situated to identify and respond to these situations.80 
A recent article critiques SOX for being a “regulatory response” to 
corporate fraud and argues that “market responses” would be superior.81 
The article suggests that markets are best-situated to address problems, 
arguing that “contract and market-based approaches are more likely than 
regulation to reach efficient results.”82 We agree with this sentiment, to 
an extent. Regulations are necessary to establish the contours within 
which “contract and market-based approaches” can operate. If corporate 
actors know that unethical conduct will have significant legal (including 
criminal) ramifications, then they will be less inclined to engage in such 
conduct.83 Thus, strong regulations are necessary precisely to enable 
contract and market-based approaches to operate in the right direction.84 
During the 1990s, the incentives for corporate executives were to 
fudge the numbers and engage in unethical conduct because the odds of 
getting caught, and the costs if they were caught, were astonishingly 
 
 79. All too often, business respond during notice-and-comment rulemaking simply to suggest 
that no new rules are necessary, instead of recognizing that rulemaking need not be a zero-sum, 
either-or game. In doing so, they cheat themselves of a valuable opportunity to engage regulators. 
For example, much of the early response from the corporate community was that compliance dates 
for SOX should be delayed significantly — even for the largest companies — or that regulation was 
unnecessary. See Internal Control Over Financial Reporting in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of 
Non-Accelerated Filers and Newly Public Companies, Release Nos. 33-8760, 34-54942, File No. 
S7-06-03, 2006 WL 3702644, at *6 (Dec. 15, 2006) [hereinafter SEC 33-8760]; U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Comments on Proposed Rule: Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406, 
and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/proposed/s74002.shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2007). 
 80. See, e.g., Chen & Hanson, supra note 6, at 23-32 (discussing the “meta script” of 
corporate law, which argues that markets are generally preferred to regulation). 
 81. Ribstein, supra note 39, at 61. 
 82. Id. at 3. 
 83. See Harshbarger & Jois, supra note 24. 
 84. As one of us argues in a separate law review article, any sort of “free market” necessarily 
involves interfering with individuals’ preferences to some extent — that is, any free market requires 
a degree of regulation. The debate, then, should not be between “regulation” and “no regulation,” 
but between the kind and degree of regulation that we will have. See Goutam U. Jois, Can’t Touch 
This! Private Property, Takings, and the Merit Goods Argument, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 183 (2006). 
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low.85 With such low costs and high benefits, tempted corporate 
executives easily succumbed. We must reform the regulatory 
environment to increase the costs of malfeasance so that market actors’ 
incentives push toward ethical conduct, not toward cheating the system. 
Regulation can play a role beyond simple cost-benefit analysis as 
well. Over time, regulations will become part of a corporation’s situation 
and, as such, the costs and benefits will change the corporation’s very 
culture. Regulation, often assumed to be exogenous, will over time 
become endogenous as companies incorporate regulatory requirements 
into their very idea of what it means to be in business. 
This is not to say that regulation is perfect. For example, 
corporations often complain, rightly, that SOX is something of a blunt 
instrument: it fails to differentiate among firms, so that small- and mid-
cap firms have to bear the same burden as Fortune 500 companies.86 But 
the obvious flip side is that if executives and boards had taken the first 
steps in self-regulation, SOX would have never been necessary. If there 
had not been and did not continue to be a successive parade of 
spectacular corporate debacles, these issues would have never come up. 
Of course industry knows better than government what firms’ capacities 
and needs are, but if corporate leaders fail to use that knowledge to 
implement reforms, government will repeatedly step in to fill the void. 
That void certainly exists. Nearly five years after SOX, companies 
are still restating earnings on a regular basis, uncovering earlier 
misconduct.87 Questions of executive compensation keep bubbling to the 
surface — most recently with the stock options scandal and a new S.E.C. 
rule,88 and individuals question why “personal responsibility” means one 
 
           85.   This was especially the situation in Silicon Valley in the 1990s, when executives felt a 
“sense of entitlement” and a “maverick culture” thrived, “where clever ways of gaming the system 
were admired rather than excoriated.” Gary Rivlin & Eric Dash, Haunted by a Heady Past; Silicon 
Valley was Calming Down. Now, an Options Scandal, N. Y. TIMES, July 22, 2006, at C1. In such an 
environment, where even the “independent” lawyers and accountants were part of the problem, see 
infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text, is it any surprise that malfeasance eventually came to 
light? 
 86. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Here It Comes: The Sarbanes-Oxley Backlash, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 17, 2005, § 3, at 5 (discussing compliance costs generally); see also Matthew Keenan, In 
Scandal Fallout, Small Firms Bear Big Burdens, BOSTON GLOBE, July 4, 2004, at C8 (discussing 
compliance costs specifically for small firms). 
 87. See, e.g., Geraldine Fabrikant, Cablevision to Restate its Earning, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 
2006, at C1. 
 88.  See, e.g., Rivlin & Dash, supra note 85 (discussing options scandal); Jonathan Peterson & 
Kathy M. Kristof, More Data on Pay at the Top is Mandated: The SEC Votes to Require More-
Detailed, ‘Plain-English’ Disclosure of Executive Compensation, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2006, 
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/ 
MediaMentions/07-27-06_LAtimes.pdf (discussing new SEC rule); Jeanne Sahadi, CEO Pay: Sky 
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thing when they go bankrupt and another thing when United Airlines 
goes bankrupt.89 The independence of some boards is still suspect,90 
while at the other extreme some boards are kept so far out of the loop 
that they don’t even know of a pending merger.91 Silicon Valley, still 
reeling from the dot-com bust, is now awash in scandals regarding 
backdated stock options,92 a scandal that has reached to the heights of 
some of the most highly-regarded tech firms, such as Apple 
Computers.93 In an article in The New York Times, Joseph Nocera wrote 
of the difficulty of changing a culture among accountants and predicted 
that “you can pretty much count on another round of accounting 
scandals.”94 Shortly thereafter, eight partners at KPMG were indicted for 
creating illegal tax shelters that reaped them millions of dollars in fees, 
while costing the government billions of dollars.95 KPMG avoided 
imploding, just barely, but perhaps Nocera’s prediction has already 
come true. 
These vignettes are not the entirety of the problem; rather, they are 
symptoms of a larger problem in corporate ethics. Ultimately, regulators 
must set the framework and business leaders must enact policies to 
foster an environment that nurtures integrity, not one that shuns it. To be 
sure, laws and regulations are part of that environment: SOX, though 
imperfect, pushes in the right direction.96 And consider the example 
from the beginning of this section: by recognizing its obligation to pay a 
“fair share of taxes,” Johnson & Johnson implicitly acknowledges that 
paying taxes has been internalized. Taxes are part of the business 
environment and factor into the company’s business judgments. Ethical 
corporate governance has yet to attain that level of respect and 
 
High Gets Even Higher, CNNMONEY, Aug. 30, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/26/news/ 
economy/ceo_pay/ (stating executive compensation generally). 
 89. See, e.g., Dale Russakoff, Human Toll of a Pension Default, WASH. POST, June 13, 2005, 
at A1. 
 90. Gretchen Morgenson, Just a Friendly Group of ‘Independent’ Directors, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 29, 2004, § 3, at 1. 
 91. Gretchen Morgenson, A Merger? Anyone Tell the Board?, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2005, § 
3, at 1. 
 92. See Rivlin & Dash, supra note 85. 
 93. See Markoff & Dash, supra note 22. 
 94. Joseph Nocera, Auditors: Too Few to Fail, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2005, at C1.  See also 
Troy Wolverton, The Big Four: Can’t Touch This?, THESTREET.COM, July 12, 2005, 
http://www.thestreet.com/stocks/troywolverton/10231757.html. 
 95. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Charges are Tied to Tax Shelters; 8 Former Partners of 
KPMG Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, at C1. 
 96. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text. See also Scott Harshbarger & Robert 
Stringer, Creating a Climate of Corporate Integrity, CORP. BOARD (May/June 2003) at 10 (noting 
the role that SOX can play in fostering a “climate of corporate integrity”). 
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significance in business culture.97 
Simultaneously, we must recognize that there are limits to what 
regulation can accomplish. It would be impossible to “regulate to 
perfection” executive compensation schemes, board independence, and 
subtle conflicts of interest because regulators do not have the time, 
information, or capacity to do so. Thus, leadership is important on the 
part of directors and officers as well as public officials.98 So are 
partnerships between regulators and industries. Just as it is impossible to 
“regulate to perfection,” it is also impossible to prosecute every single 
wrongdoer. The best solutions come from cooperative efforts by 
regulators and companies to identify a common goal — a competitive, 
ethical corporate culture — and work collaboratively toward it.99 
In the end, the theme is quite simple: we are looking for 
accountability. The calls for integrity and accountability from politicians 
are rightly loud and constant. Citizens and elected officials constantly 
call on accountability from police officers, public school teachers, and 
nonprofit leaders. Why do we not ask the same of the private sector? 
IV.  DELVING INTO SARBANES-OXLEY 
In this section, we want to situate our general discussion of 
corporate ethics in the specific context of SOX. First, 2006 marked a 
year of extensive discussion, and some decisions, about the (in)famous 
Section 404. Second, the unabated stream of corporate restatements and 
continuing scandals of executive compensation raise questions about the 
adequacy of the clawback provisions that currently exist in the law. 
Finally, the trials of former corporate executives raise the issue of white-
collar crime generally, and the role of lawyers specifically. 
 
 97. At another level of abstraction, consider Chen and Hanson’s argument regarding the 
importance of situation. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 6, at 127-149. Laws and regulations, far 
from being external to the corporate world, are part of and shape the corporate situation. Id. Over 
time, companies will internalize the laws and rules and their conduct will change. Id. 
 98. See generally Scott Harshbarger, Strengthening Democracy: The Challenge of Public 
Interest Law, 56 ME. L. REV. 211 (2004) (discussing the importance of leadership and particularly 
the role of lawyers). Cf. Ethical Dilemmas Associated With the Corporate Attorney’s New Role, 52 
AM. U. L. REV. 655 (2003) (discussing the role of attorneys under SOX). 
 99. Something we find curious is that the principles and the rhetoric found in the criminal 
prosecution context seems absent in the white-collar context. Those who call for “victim’s rights” in 
cases of assault or rape, for example, are often loath to do so in the case of corporate misconduct. 
Yet prosecution can be tough and smart, and we need not sacrifice our principles of justice and 
fairness — and, indeed, welfare maximization — in the corporate context. Cf. Harshbarger, supra 
note 98 (describing the Boston Safe Neighborhood Initiative). 
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A.  Section 404 
The beginning of 2006 featured extensive debate, and some 
rulemaking, about compliance with Section 404 of SOX, the so-called 
internal controls regulations.100 Although all companies were to have 
complied with Section 404 by 2005, the SEC repeatedly deferred the 
effective date for smaller companies. Simultaneously, Chairman Cox 
made it clear that smaller companies would not be wholly exempt from 
the internal controls regulations.101 Eventually, the SEC promulgated 
relaxed requirements for smaller companies.102 
Many companies have complained about the requirements of 
Section 404, particularly because it imposes disproportionate costs on 
small and mid-sized firms.103 One commentator remarked that, “[l]ike 
their peers at more sizable corporations, small-company executives must 
also help their auditors adhere to . . . the requirement under [Section] 
404 that external auditors must attest to and report on their clients’ 
assessments of internal controls.”104 While larger firms might spend as 
little as 0.06% of sales on Section 404 compliance, a smaller firm with 
less than $100 million in revenue might see costs averaging 2.55% of 
sales.105 This, according to a trade association, amounts to a “major 
 
 100. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006). The text of Section 404 reads as follows: 
(a) Rules required. The Commission shall prescribe rules requiring each annual report 
required by section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 
78m or 78o(d)) to contain an internal control report, which shall— 
  (1) state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate 
internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and 
  (2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of 
the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for 
financial reporting. 
(b) Internal control evaluation and reporting. With respect to the internal control 
assessment required by subsection (a), each registered public accounting firm that 
prepares or issues the audit report for the issuer shall attest to, and report on, the 
assessment made by the management of the issuer. An attestation made under this 
subsection shall be made in accordance with standards for attestation engagements 
issued or adopted by the Board. Any such attestation shall not be the subject of a 
separate engagement. 
Id. 
 101. Kathleen Day, Sarbanes-Oxley Exception Denied; Small Public Companies Must Comply, 
SEC Says, WASH. POST, May 18, 2006, at D2. 
 102. SEC 33-8760, supra note 79 (providing smaller businesses an extension through 
December 31, 2007); Steven Labaton, S.E.C. Eases Regulations On Business, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 
2006, at C1 [hereinafter Labaton, SEC Eases Regulations]. 
 103. See, e.g., David M. Katz, Smaller Than a Sarbox?, CFO.COM, March 24, 2005, 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3764856. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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regressive tax on small and medium companies.”106 
These costs are significant and can influence companies’ decision-
making. Companies might put off expansion or growth plans to avoid 
incurring costs in addition to Section 404 costs. Alternatively, and more 
dangerously in the context of our Article, a company might be tempted 
to “cut corners” in its Section 404 programs. For example, the company 
might enact compliance policies and procedures that effectively exist 
only on paper. An auditor might test the program, but the company 
might not emphasize the controls or the need to report misconduct, 
create a culture of compliance, and so on. Moreover, the provisions 
might divert money from other programs that would better serve the 
overall goal of fostering an ethical corporate culture. A small-cap firm 
that spent a disproportionately high amount of money on Section 404 
compliance might then be forced, for financial reasons, to forego 
additional employee training, director orientation, or similar programs 
designed to better orient employees toward a genuine focus on ethical 
conduct. 
We argue that regulators should be more accommodating of these 
concerns and allow smaller firms (we use that term to mean non-
accelerated filers under 12b-2107) to be exempt from the primary 
provisions of Section 404. Specifically, small firms’ external auditors 
should not be required to attest to an evaluation of the company’s 
internal controls. Instead, the auditor should merely verify the existence 
of the controls and allow company executives to develop the controls in 
a manner best fit for their company. However, the auditor should 
conduct a regular (though not necessarily annual) “performance 
evaluation” and evaluate the actual incidence of malfeasance within the 
company. The current rules which require “design evaluation” correctly 
place a priority on having systems in place. Smaller firms, however, 
should place the emphasis on outcomes, good governance ex post, rather 
than mere process ex ante.108 
Additionally, company officers should have to certify changes to 
procedures only annually, instead of quarterly.109 For many of these 
entities, certifying officers have a good sense of what is happening in 
 
 106. Id. (quoting a study by the American Electronics Association). 
 107. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2006). 
 108. Cf. Final Rule: Management’s Report On Internal Control Over Financial Reporting And 
Certification Of Disclosure In Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Release Nos. 33-8238, 34-47986, 80 
SEC Docket 1014 § VII.E (Aug. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Final Rule] (distinguishing between 
performance and design standards). 
 109. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15 (2006). 
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their firms. Unlike larger firms where the upward flow of information 
might be impeded, smaller firms’ executives are often in a better 
position to foster an ethical corporate culture even in the absence of 
formal policies. Process and quarterly certifications will do little to 
improve that. 
We do not, however, favor exempting small companies from 
Section 404 altogether. First, we believe that all companies need 
independent oversight and evaluation, not just large companies. Second, 
we are not convinced that compliance costs are as crippling as some 
critics make them out to be. For example, one article notes that 
“compliance cost[s] for smaller companies [are] at around $1.2 million 
for the first year of implementation.”110 They do not point out that costs 
decline over time: “31% in 2005 for small companies, according to one 
study.”111 As the author sardonically comments, “you wonder why our 
bankruptcy courts are not clogged with companies made insolvent by 
Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs.”112 While regulators must recognize 
that costs are high, business leaders must recognize that oversight and 
accountability will inevitably involve cost. The question is one of the 
degree of oversight and accountability that we will require — not 
whether we will require them in the first place. 
The costs of 404 compliance are well documented; the benefits less 
so. AuditAnalytics, a company that analyzes audit statistics, unearthed 
some interesting data regarding financial restatements over the past few 
years. In 2005 and early 2006, although the total number of restatements 
was up from the previous year, the increase is mainly among smaller 
firms.113 Smaller accounting firms, which audit these smaller companies, 
were in the past subject only to peer review.114 In a particularly 
egregious example, the head of an auditing firm went to jail for covering 
up an embezzlement scheme in a New York School District.115 “The 
 
 110. Jim DeMint & Tom Feeney, Common-Sense Changes, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2006, at 
A18. 
 111. David Weidner, Investors and Executives Need Sarb-Ox: Now Isn’t the Time to Shelve 
Post-Enron Reforms, MARKETWATCH, June 21, 2006, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/sarb-ox-critics-have-short-term-
memories/story.aspx?guid=%7B4CD2779F%2D126D%2D45F0%2D9CAE%2D4C3567B20909%7
D. This underscores the reality that businesses were under-investing in internal controls in the years 
prior to SOX. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Floyd Norris, High and Low Finance: Forcing Reality in Accounting of Tiny Firms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2006, at C1. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. See also Paul Vitello, Accountant Is Sentenced For Hiding Roslyn Thefts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 26, 2006, at B4. 
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peer review of his firm had looked at precisely that audit, and found no 
problems.”116 
Restatements are up among small firms because their auditors are 
now subject to oversight by the SOX-created Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).117 Faced with external scrutiny, 
those auditors are doing better work. Again, the vignette of the jailed 
accountant demonstrates the utility of legal responses when “self-
regulation” breaks down. In this case, the peer reviews of audit firms 
were poor, approving even outright embezzlement.118 PCAOB’s 
oversight has helped keep those outside auditors honest. More relevant 
to this discussion, the newly-accountable auditors are more accurately 
uncovering misconduct at smaller firms.119 Exempting small firms from 
404 requirements would enable this misconduct to go unnoticed. 
It is also worth noting that we do not find compelling another 
criticism of SOX: that, as globalization continues to take root, issuers 
will either feel obligated to adopt (inefficient) U.S. standards120 or not 
list on American exchanges in the first place.121 As proof of the latter 
proposition, SOX critics point out that although cross-border IPOs are at 
an all-time high, “nine of every 10 dollars raised by foreign companies 
in new stock offerings [in 2005] were raised abroad.”122 But will 
companies really leave U.S. markets for greener pastures? Possibly, but, 
as Nasdaq President & CEO Bob Grierfield notes, “a ‘race to the 
bottom’ can only be self-defeating.”123 He points out that “ADRs fled 
the American market in droves” in the 1980s after the SEC “tightened up 
the 12(g)3-2b exemption” and that major American companies have 
experimented with foreign listings, “only to be disappointed with the 
results. The real lesson of the ‘80s is not how many companies fled from 
regulation, but how many came back.”124 He predicts a similar about-
face following the latest furor over 404 requirements, and we find his 
 
 116. Norris, supra note 113. 
 117. See id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See, e.g., Harvey Pitt, Sarbanes-Oxley is an Unhealthy Export, FINANCIAL TIMES, June 
21, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonspeakers.com/prod_images/pdfs/PittHarvey. 
SarbanesOxleyIsAnUnhealthyExport.06.21.06.pdf. 
 121. Cf. Bob Greifeld, It’s Time to Pull Up Our SOX, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2006, at A14 
(noting that criticism but ultimately not swayed by it). This is related to the critique that argues that 
firms will either go private or simply not list in the first place to avoid regulation. See Emily 
Thornton, A Little Privacy, Please, BUS. WK., May 24, 2004, at 74. 
 122. DeMint & Feeney, supra note 110. 
 123. Greifeld, supra note 121. 
 124. Id. 
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argument compelling.125 
The SEC has reasoned that it would be “inconsistent with the 
purposes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to specify different requirements for 
small entities”126 and has reinforced this belief recently.127 This 
statement is not entirely correct. While different requirements might be 
inconsistent with SOX’s aims, they are not necessarily inconsistent. If 
they are designed, as our proposals are, in line with the overarching 
impetus behind SOX and our Article, then modified requirements could 
easily further the purposes of the Act. 
Indeed, any revision of SOX, even for small companies, must 
recognize the simple fact that regulation works. In the first half of 2006, 
the eight largest accounting firms actually saw restatements drop by 31 
 
 125. See id. We also agree with Mr. Greifeld’s plan to “self-initiate” a race to the top so that 
markets “can avoid overreaching regulation that constricts business and stifles initiative.” Id. 
NASDAQ has, in this vein, created “a new market tier with the highest listing standards on the 
planet.” His policy reflects one of our themes: if business leaders get ahead of the curve and self-
initiate, to use his term, proactive changes, regulators will be less likely to “crack down.” We do 
not, however, agree with his proposal to exempt smaller companies from 404 altogether. Cf. id. 
It is also worth noting the new chorus of anti-SOX commentators complaining that SOX forces the 
world to adopt U.S. standards. See, e.g., Pitt, supra note 120. When the world converges in a “Race 
to Delaware” in corporate law generally, this is seen as proof of the power of markets and the 
validity of the consensus. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, THE  GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 
(1993); S. Samuel Arsht, Reply to Professor Cary, 31 BUS. LAW 1113 (1976) (critiquing the 
position, initially put forth by Professor William Cary, that Delaware’s corporate law was creating a 
“race to the bottom”). The idea is similarly raised in the recent report of the Committee on Capital 
Markets Regulation. See Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report of the 
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Nov. 30, 2006 [hereinafter CCMR Report], at 1, 
available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (noting 
that U.S. markets are less competitive compared with those abroad, because of SOX). 
  But if convergence is good elsewhere, why is convergence bad in the SOX context? 
Conversely, if convergence is bad, we should seriously question the so-called Delaware consensus. 
There is some literature on this subject. See, e.g., Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 588 (2003) (arguing that Delaware’s main competition in promulgating rules of corporate law 
is the federal government, not other states). Yet in the SOX context, for some reason, the U.S. 
regulatory regime is considered undesirable. We are unsure what to make of this dissonance, except 
to point it out and speculate that, perhaps, what is really motivating the comments is not a reasoned 
concern for what types of regulation may or may not be best for global markets, but instead, a 
single-minded concern with what regulatory regime is good for business, and nothing more. 
 126. Final Rule, supra note 108. 
 127. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. Cf. Thornton, supra note 121 (noting the 
pressure SOX regulations are imposing on companies to stay or return to private status/selling or 
merging). Yet the benefits of Section 404 are well documented; compliance has improved internal 
controls while cost decline over time. See Floyd Norris, Audit Law’s Costs Decline, Survey Shows, 
N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2006, at C2. In the years since (some) companies have had to comply with 
Section 404, the number of companies with material weaknesses in their internal controls has 
declined significantly. Id. In short, costs decline over time and the law works. Businesses should 
recognize the benefits of the regulation while the SEC should recognize the costs; our proposal does 
both. 
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percent from a year earlier.128 In contrast, “restatements more than 
doubled in the same period for smaller firms.”129 This discrepancy is 
attributed to Section 404: smaller firms have to comply with the new 
rule; as a result, “someone is looking at those [smaller] firms for the first 
time.”130 Moreover, evidence suggests that the restatements are being 
analyzed carefully in deciding whether executives should be held 
accountable.131 Only eight percent of CFOs were replaced when 
restatements were the result of errors involving “highly technical” 
judgments regarding derivatives,132 while thirty percent of CFOs were 
replaced when restatements were the result of revenue recognition, “a 
prime source of fraud.”133 And even the CCMR Report agrees that SOX 
compliance costs decline over time.134 
With some of the concerns about SOX in mind, two committees are 
proposing regulatory changes in response to what they see as the 
excessive burdens of the recent increase in regulation. Members of both 
committees reported “that Section 404, along with greater threat of 
investor lawsuits and government prosecutions, had discouraged foreign 
companies from issuing new stock on exchanges in the United States in 
recent months.”135 With the goal of increasing the “attractiveness” of 
U.S. capital markets, the committees hope to loosen regulations by 
introducing “broad new protections to corporations and accounting firms 
against criminal cases brought by federal and state prosecutors as well as 
a stronger shield against civil lawsuits from investors.”136 Many of the 
proposals are being formed so that the S.E.C. and the Justice Department 
could implement the changes by promulgating new regulations.137 Such 
a strategy, the thinking goes, would obviate the need for new legislation 
from Congress. 
One committee was formed by the head of the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce and the other by Harvard Law School professor Hal S. Scott. 
The latter, the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, released its 
interim report on November 30, 2006 and has found that SOX has 
increased regulation to the extent that it is hurting the competitiveness of 
 
 128. Norris, supra note 127. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. CCMR Report, supra note 125, at 47. 
 135. Labaton, Businesses Seek New Protection, supra note 38. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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U.S. capital markets.138 In their report, the Committee cites the costs of 
complying with Section 404 of SOX,139 uncoordinated state and federal 
enforcement laws and activities,140 the elimination of countless jobs due 
to the “criminal indictment of entire companies,”141 as well as the 
costliness of private enforcement in the form of securities law class 
action suits142 as major causes of the erosion of competitiveness. 
Focusing on five categories requiring change, the Committee 
offered recommendations to decrease regulation and litigation while 
enhancing the rights of shareholders in order to improve the 
competitiveness of U.S. markets.143 With regards to SOX, the 
Committee advised implementation changes, particularly of Section 
404.144 The Committee suggested that the SEC adopt a reasonable 
materiality standard both for internal controls and financial statements145 
and that the SEC and PCAOB adopt enhanced guidance on auditors’ role 
and duties in testing for compliance with Section 404.146 The Committee 
went on to say that if the revised Section 404 regulations were seen as 
too burdensome for small companies even after the general reforms 
outlined above are implemented, legislative revisions may be necessary 
and, in this case, the SEC should recommend to Congress that small 
companies be exempt from auditor attestation and be subject to a 
different standard for management certification.147 
 
 138. See generally CCMR Report, supra note 125. 
 139. See id. at 125-27. 
 140. See id. at 68-69. 
 141. Id. at 85. 
 142. Id. at 72. 
 143. See id. at 1-22. 
 144. Id. at 115-35. 
 145. See id. at 131-32. 
 146. See id. at 132. 
 147. See id. at 133. The Committee also made a variety of suggestions not related to SOX. For 
example, it recommended that shareholders receive increased rights, particularly through a change 
in their voting from plurality to majority, by requiring shareholder approval of poison pills, and by 
giving shareholders the ability to decide the manner in which disputes with their company would be 
resolved. See id. at 93, 102-04, 105-06, 109-12. To improve the regulatory process, the Committee 
suggests that the SEC and self-regulatory organizations better analyze the costs and benefits of new 
rules, that they more usefully differentiate between wholesale and retail investors, that they 
regularly test current rules according to the cost-benefit analysis, and that the SEC and other public 
enforcement bodies improve their communication and coordinate their movements. See id. at 60-65, 
67-68. 
  In the category of public and private enforcement, the Committee suggested greater clarity 
for private litigation under Rule 10b-5 (for securities fraud), positing that the materiality and 
scienter requirements are unclear. See id. at 80-81. Criminal enforcement, the Committee suggested, 
should be a last resort, reserved for companies that have become criminal enterprises from top to 
bottom. See id. at 85. Moreover, the Committee proposed that outside directors not be held 
responsible for corporate malfeasance when such malfeasance was outside the scope of what they 
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So what will happen in fact? The SEC has recently promulgated 
new rules that were characterized as “a loose interpretation” of Section 
404.148  The revised rules allow auditors to employ a “material risk” 
standard, much like what the CCMR Report suggested, scrutinizing only 
those internal controls that would carry a material risk of having an 
adverse impact on financial statements.149 
This SEC’s new material risk standard, we believe, does much to 
reduce the compliance burden on small firms. It remains to be seen 
whether the Section 404 revision (and the McNulty Memo, released at 
approximately the same time150) are viewed as a compromise between 
the two extremes — calling for a rollback of SOX and a maintenance of 
the regime — or merely the first of many steps that reduce regulatory 
requirements. If the latter, we worry that SOX’s protections may be 
diluted to the point of inefficacy. If the former, then we cautiously 
applaud a process that, at least in fits and starts, is starting to negotiate a 
median path that recognizes the benefits of a regulatory baseline while 
not imposing undue burdens on business. 
 
might detect. See id. at 73. The interim report also suggested protecting outside board members 
against liability when they rely in good faith on the audited financial statements, speculating that 
otherwise, it would be difficult to attract independent directors to boards. See id. at 90-91. 
  Some of these suggestions are already being heeded.  As of this writing, the S.E.C. had 
filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court that would make it more difficult for shareholders to file 
lawsuits against corporations. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 853 (No. 06-484). 
Simultaneously, “the agency’s chief accountant told a conference that it was considering ways to 
protect accounting firms from large damage awards in cases brought by investors and companies.” 
Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Seeks to Curtail Investor Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, at C1. These 
reforms are ostensibly to help shareholders, but we are skeptical of such a claim. 
  A full analysis of, and response to, the CCMR report is beyond the scope of this Article, 
and we are confident that others will take up this task in the upcoming months. However, it is worth 
mentioning that the report takes a fairly harsh view of SOX specifically and regulation generally. 
Although we believe that U.S. capital markets must be competitive with those around the world, we 
also believe that the investor protections—tangible protections, such as regulation, as well as 
intangible protections, such as a general faith in the viability of U.S. capital markets—offered by 
U.S. markets are unparalleled. Cf. Griefeld, supra note 121 (noting that the real lesson in the 1980s, 
after U.S. markets tightened regulation, was “not how many companies fled from regulation, but 
how many came back”). Relaxing SOX requirements and making securities fraud lawsuits difficult 
might empower managers and increase their discretion to act in a relatively unfettered manner. We 
are not, however, convinced that doing so will serve the immediate goal of improving investor 
confidence in U.S. markets. We are even less convinced that doing so will serve the overall goal of 
nurturing a new culture of corporate governance in which the emphasis is on ethical conduct and not 
on wide-ranging discretion for managers with diminished oversight. Indeed, the burden of this 
Article is to challenge these arguments, and to provide an alternative. 
 148. SEC 33-8760, supra note 79; Labaton, Businesses Seek New Protection, supra note 38. 
 149. SEC 33-8760, supra note 79, at 6; Labaton, SEC Eases Regulations, supra note 102. 
 150. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Clawback Provisions 
If Section 404 perhaps goes too far in certain regards, Section 304 
does not go far enough.151 Section 304 provides a rather weak “clawback 
provision,” by which a company may recoup compensation paid to 
executives after malfeasance.152 Specifically, if an issuer of securities 
files an earnings restatement because of misconduct resulting in 
“material noncompliance” with financial reporting requirements, then 
the CEO and CFO are required to reimburse the issuer for (1) bonuses 
and other compensation received in the twelve months following the first 
filing of financials subject to a restatement; and (2) any profits derived 
from the sale of the issuer’s securities during those twelve months.153 
We argue that these provisions are extraordinarily weak. SOX 
recognizes that top executives set the tone in a company and that 
corporate culture depends critically on executives’ willingness to take 
responsibility for their company’s actions.154 If executives are truly to 
have an incentive to manage a company ethically, they should forfeit pay 
when material noncompliance happens on their watch. After all, Section 
302 requires executives to attest to the truthfulness of their company’s 
statements.155 An earnings restatement necessarily means that earlier 
financials, to which the executive attested, were wrong.156 
Thus, SOX’s clawback provisions should be strengthened. The 
executives should forfeit compensation from the initial financial report 
until present, not just twelve months forward.157 Moreover, the provision 
 
 151. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7243 (2006) (SOX § 304). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (2006) (SOX § 302) (requiring company executives to 
personally certify and take responsibility for, inter alia, the accuracy of reports, the existence of 
internal controls, and appropriate disclosure). 
 155. Id. 
 156. At least three courts seem to have held that CEO and CFO certification, without more, is 
insufficient to constitute scienter under the securities laws for a securities fraud violation. See In re 
Watchguard Sec. Litig., No. C05-678J, 2006 WL 2038656, at *12 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 12, 2006); In 
re Invision Technologies, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C04-03181 MJJ, 2006 WL 538752, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 27, 2006); In re Lattice Semiconductor Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV04-1255-AA, 2006 WL 
538756, at *12, *15 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 2006). However, this is, at least arguably, distinct from the 
position we are advocating above. Disgorgement was always a remedy at common law and under 
the securities laws. SOX’s clawback provisions must be distinct from those causes of action; 
otherwise, § 304 would be superfluous. We argue here that CEO and CFO certification should be 
sufficient to demonstrate knowledge for § 304 clawback purposes. In the case of regular securities 
fraud actions, for example under Rule 10b-5, more may be required to properly allege scienter and 
survive a motion to dismiss, as happened in Watchguard and Invision. 
 157. Except, of course, for the unlikely cases where the time frame was less than twelve 
months, in which case they should forfeit pay for the full twelve-month period. 
29
Harshbarger and Jois: Looking Back and Looking Forward
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
HARSHBARGER & JOIS 3/26/2007  12:05:05 PM 
30 AKRON LAW REVIEW [40:1 
should be triggered by material noncompliance with any securities laws, 
not just financial reporting requirements. Additionally, executives could 
be required to reimburse some percentage of their salary greater than 
100%. For example, executives might be required to reimburse issuers 
125% of their compensation and then pay a fine to the SEC of an 
additional 25%, bringing total fines to 150% of all compensation (salary, 
bonus, and equity). Finally, there should be an explicit private right of 
action under Section 304, so that enforcement of the provision does not 
depend solely on the SEC’s discretion.158 
This is particularly important because so many executives receive 
equity compensation. And while one argument suggests that stock 
options align the incentives of executives and shareholders — namely, 
increasing shareholder value — empirical evidence suggests that this 
might not be the case. Executives, instead of working for the benefit of 
shareholders, have an incentive to increase a company’s short-term value 
and exercise their options regardless of long-term consequences. A 2005 
study found that executives who received “substantial amounts of in-the-
money options . . . were more likely to issue financial statements with 
non-GAAP accounting irregularities.”159 The recent stock options 
scandal only increases the possibility of more malfeasance.160 In other 
 
 158. Cf. 15 U.S.C. 7244 (2006) (SOX § 306) (explicitly affording a private right of action in 
the insider trading context). A similar provision could create a private right of action here. 
  A variety of federal district courts have considered the issue and found that there is no 
private right of action under Section 304. See, e.g., Kogan v. Robinson, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1076 
(S.D. Cal. 2006); Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (concluding that 
“Congress did not intend to create an implied [private] right of action in Section 304”); In re BiSys 
Group, Inc. Derivative Action, 396 F. Supp. 2d 463, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding the same, 
“substantially for the reasons stated in Neer”); In re Whitehall Jewellers, Inc. S’holder Derivative 
Litig., No. 05-C-1050, 2006 WL 468012, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2006); In re Digimarc Corp. 
Derivative Litig., No. 05-1534, 2006 WL 2345497, at *2-3 (D. Or. Aug. 11, 2006) (same). As of 
this writing, no U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal has issued a decision. See In re Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co. Derivative Litig., No. 5:03CV2180, 2007 WL 43557, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 5, 2007) 
(noting that at least three cases have been docketed, but none has resulted in a decision). Although 
an argument can be raised that an implied private right exists under Section 304 using the four-part 
test from Cort  v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); see, e.g., Pl’s Memo. of Law in Opp’n to Defs’ Second 
Motion to Dismiss Pl’s Amended S’holder Derivative Complaint at 19, Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 
2d 648 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (No. 2:04-cv-4791-SD), and though we believe this argument has merit, 
Section 304 should be revised to make this explicit. In the interim, the SEC should be aggressive in 
pursuing the disgorgement remedy under this section — thus far, it has not done so even once. See 
Pl’s Memo. of Opp’n to Defs’ Second Motion to Dismiss Pl’s Amended S’holder Derivative 
Complaint at 17-19, Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (No. 2:04-cv-4791-SD). 
 159. Jap Efendi et al., Why Do Corporate Managers Misstate Financial Statements? The Role 
of In-The-Money Options and Other Incentives 33 (Working Paper Series, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=547922. 
 160. At least one commentator has suggested that the backdating scandal is nothing more than 
run-of-the-mill securities fraud: the executives are essentially “lying to someone to get [him] to hold 
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words, equity compensation increases agency costs that must then be 
borne by shareholders.161 Shareholders must be reimbursed not only for 
the dollar value of the fraud but for these other, indirect, costs as well. 
For this reason, we propose stricter clawback provisions, including 
punitive damages mechanisms. 
1.  Boards of directors 
Our discussion of clawbacks requires an argument for stronger 
boards of directors more generally. This examination in turn illuminates 
the dynamic between boards and executives, especially in the realm of 
compensation. In their recent book, Lucian Bebchuck and Jesse Fried 
argue that executives are essentially getting “pay without 
performance.”162 Simultaneously, while executive compensation has 
been rising, effectively linking pay to performance has proven elusive.163 
On the one hand, granting executives stock options seems to give them 
an incentive to increase shareholder value. But equity compensation and 
the likelihood of an earnings restatement are positively correlated, 
 
the company’s stock or buy more.” Posting of Broc Romanek to http://www.deallawyers.com/blog 
(Aug. 7, 2006) (citing Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 195, 197 (2003)), for the definition of fraud: “lying to someone to get them to give you their 
stuff”). Though this view seems not to have caught on, if it did, presumably shareholders would 
have the full panoply of causes of action and remedies available to them, including under the 
securities laws and common law fraud.  It is worth noting, however, that at press time, two 
Delaware courts have ruled that directors may be liable for “well-timed” stock options.  See In re 
Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 1106-N, 2007 WL 416132 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 
2007); Ryan v. Gifford, C.A. No. 2213-N, 2007 WL 416162 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2007).  It is, of 
course, an open question whether the directors will actually be held liable or whether the promise of 
reform will be merely illusory.  At least one law firm thinks that although the decisions will be 
“much-ballyhooed,” like the Disney decision, see infra notes 164-65, “it may be that such 
complaints will survive motions to dismiss but not give rise to actual liability when litigated to 
conclusion.”  Robert A. Profusek et al., Two Delaware Chancery Court Cases on Backdating and 
Spring-Loading Options Increase the Stakes for Directors, 
http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S3993 (last visited March 1, 2007).  
 161. Id. 
 162. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). Professor Bebchuk has been active of late, 
lambasting problems over high compensation, lack of shareholder rights, and most recently, 
backdated options. In an op-ed, he wrote, “For corporate America to improve its governance going 
forward, boards should face up to – and fully share with shareholders – past governance problems in 
their companies.” Lucian Bebchuk, Inside Jobs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2007, at A6 [hereinafter 
Bebchuk, Inside Jobs]. We wholeheartedly agree. 
 163. See Claudia H. Deutsch, My Big Fat C.E.O. Paycheck, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, § 3, at 
1. Providing non-equity compensation does not provide executives with an incentive to increase 
shareholder value, while providing equity compensation in the form of stock options only provides 
an incentive to boost the stock’s short-term price, which is generally not in line with shareholders’ 
interests. Id. 
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suggesting that the way options are granted is flawed.164 For this reason, 
we suggest aggressive clawback provisions. Thus, no matter how an 
executive is compensated, he will be held to account if things go poorly. 
But boards should make responsible decisions even when things are 
going well. A recent court case held that the Disney board of directors 
was not liable for an outlandish compensation package that it paid to 
Michael Ovitz, holding that the plan, while extravagant, was within the 
bounds of the “Business Judgment Rule.”165 Here, the directors escaped 
unscathed. The Chancellor wrote: 
[I]t is perhaps worth pointing out that the actions (and the failures to 
act) of the Disney board that gave rise to this lawsuit took place ten 
years ago [around 1995 and 1996], and that applying 21st century 
notions of best practices in analyzing whether those decisions were 
actionable would be misplaced.166 
That reasoning is open to debate on the merits; for example, we 
believe that the board should have been responsible under theories that 
do not necessarily turn on twenty-first century notions of best practices 
such as breach of fiduciary duty or waste of corporate assets. However, 
it is quite clear that as increasing numbers of executives and others come 
under scrutiny for more recent malfeasance — such as John and 
Timothy Rigas, Bernard Ebbers, Richard Scrushy, the KPMG partners, 
Fannie Mae, and others — the Chancellor’s reasoning no longer holds. 
All business leaders today know about the new realities of corporate 
governance, and their conduct should be held to the highest ethical and 
legal standards. Defendants in the next round of shareholder derivative 
actions should not be allowed to avoid responsibility by claiming that 
corporate governance was not “on the radar” at the time. As we have 
repeatedly pointed out, it is on the radar, and it is here to stay. 
The Wall Street Journal’s 2006 report on executive compensation 
illustrates the need for informed, engaged boards of directors. Using a 
new tool called “tally sheets,” boards are finally able to calculate exactly 
how much their CEOs are making.167 The sheets are “[n]icknamed ‘holy 
cow’ sheets for the way they often expose the immense worth of current 
and potential payouts.”168 The sheets give boards a heretofore absent 
ability to forecast total compensation under different scenarios covering 
 
 164. See Efendi, supra notes 159, at 31, 33. 
 165. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. 15452, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *3 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 9, 2005). 
 166. Id. at *4. 
 167. Joann S. Lublin, Adding It All Up, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2006, at R1. 
 168. Id. 
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salary, bonuses, stock options, pensions, and other remuneration.169 
The remarkable thing is that tally sheets have been absent from the 
corporate landscape for so long. Indeed, among the 350 firms featured in 
the Journal’s report, only fifty boards were using tally sheets.170 Of the 
balance, it is an open question as to how many boards are unaware of the 
“holy cow” nature of their executives’ pay. 
The tally sheets vignette illustrates just one of the many ways in 
which boards must become more actively engaged and empowered to 
monitor the performance of their CEOs. Recently, the backdating of 
stock options, an alarmingly pervasive practice, seems to be the scandal 
du jour.171 Initially thought merely to pad executives’ pockets, now it 
appears that “executives may have changed the so-called exercise 
date . . . to avoid paying hundreds of thousands of dollars in income 
tax.”172 Again, boards are confronted with the question: are corporate 
executives going to continue to get “pay without performance?” 
Independent oversight is critical, both from government and watchdog 
groups as well as independent, empowered directors. When these 
controls break down, excess and scandal are only a matter of when, not 
if. 
As we noted earlier, it is impossible for regulators and courts to 
monitor every instance of improper executive compensation or 
performance. Boards, then, become one of the first lines of defense 
against these excesses. They can only do their jobs if they are strong, 
empowered, sufficiently independent, and accountable. 
C.  The Role of Professionals 
In a speech in 2004, one of us remarked: 
[W]hat also leaps out at me is that in nearly every single transaction at 
WorldCom, Enron, Global Crossing, Adelphia, Tyco, Qwest, and any 
of the other leading examples of serious corporate problems involving 
crime, fraud, schemes, and malfeasance, in all those cases, there was a 
lawyer who, at some level, saw, heard, reviewed, analyzed, and billed 
for legal services rendered. What did we see? What did we do? What 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Rivlin & Dash, supra note 85; Damon Darlin & Eric Dash, 2 Are Charged in Criminal 
Case on Stock Options, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2006, at A1. 
 172. Eric Dash, Dodging Taxes is a New Wrinkle in the Stock Options Game, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
30, 2006, at C1. 
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should we do now?173 
These questions regarding the role of lawyers specifically and of 
professionals generally are of utmost importance in setting the future 
course of corporate governance and ethics in this country. This begins 
with SOX’s requirements for public companies to have audits conducted 
by independent accountants174 and for lawyers to report evidence of 
illegal activity to the company’s executives and independent directors.175 
These requirements are important when juxtaposed against the 
questions posed in the quotation at the beginning of this section. Indeed, 
the current options backdating scandal once again raises questions about 
lawyers and accountants and how they did — or did not — fulfill their 
professional roles. The backdating scandal is so jarring that commentator 
Ben Stein compares it to “pick[ing] lottery numbers after the winning 
numbers are drawn — and your stockholders supply the prize money.”176 
A prominent Silicon Valley law firm has come under suspicion, and 
accounting firms are not escaping unscathed.177 Earlier, we discussed 
how WorldCom’s actions led to a race to the bottom that affected the 
entire telecommunications industry.178 Similarly, the heady days of the 
dot-com boom compromised lawyers’ and accountants’ independent 
judgment. Accounting firms’ work, one commentator noted, became 
“client-driven . . . with the accounting firm saying ‘Sounds O.K. to me’ 
without exercising proper oversight.”179 The same was true for law 
firms; instead of keeping companies honest, they caved to the 
“enormous pressure . . . to keep their newly minted clients happy.”180 
This, of course, reinforces our theme in this Article. Just like the 
corporate executives, the lawyers and accountants did not set out 
intending to do evil — to whitewash companies’ dubious practices. 
Instead, market pressures forced them to accommodate their high-
 
 173. Harshbarger, supra note 98, at 221. 
 174. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) & (l) (2006) (SOX §§ 201, 206) (describing “prohibited 
activities” and “conflicts of interest” provisions, respectively). 
 175. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006) (SOX § 307) (Rules of Professional Responsibility for 
Attorneys). 
 176. Ben Stein, So Many Millions, So Little Body Armor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2007, § 3, at 3 
(emphasis added). Stein notes that the backdating problem is “precisely an example of a failure of 
internal controls,” thus undercutting the argument in the CCMR report that SOX “was supposedly 
too strict in requiring audits of internal controls.” Id. We completely agree with this sentiment, and 
it dovetails with our general observation that the calls for relaxing regulation might be more credible 
if there were not a steady stream of continuing corporate misconduct. 
 177. See Rivlin & Dash, supra note 85. 
 178. See Belson, supra note 13; see also supra text accompanying notes 8-15 and 40-41. 
 179. Rivlin & Dash, supra note 85. 
 180. Id. 
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profile, “rock star” clients, and in the process, they compromised the 
very judgment and independence that is their stock-in-trade. 
Professionals play an important role in fostering an ethical 
corporate culture. Accountants, lawyers, independent directors, and 
others have the best access to a company’s policies and procedures and 
are almost always in a better position to find and correct malfeasance 
before regulators. Indeed, by the time a government agency comes to 
know of fraud, it is generally too late: shareholders, citizens, and 
communities have already been harmed in some way. In contrast, the 
professionals providing services to these corporations should have 
firsthand knowledge of where the company’s practices are suspect and 
where it might face risks. 
In cases of malfeasance this raises two equally undesirable 
possibilities. On the one hand, the professionals might have been so 
inept that they were wholly unaware of the malfeasance that was taking 
place. On the other hand, and probably worse, the professionals were 
fully aware of the overstatements, the conflicts of interest, the insider 
trading, and blessed it anyway—collecting their fees and stamping their 
approval.181 
A recent article points out that the government considers lawyers 
the “first line of defense” with regard to white-collar crime.182 Lawyers 
are generally in the best position to notice and curtail such crime. 
Moreover, lawyers can counsel their clients as to how best to avoid legal 
problems (as well as how to solve them when they occur). Professional 
associations for lawyers and accountants should establish high standards 
of conduct that go even farther than Section 307 in requiring members to 
work aggressively to deter and then report malfeasance. In exchange for 
doing so, the individuals and organizations involved should get 
immunity from government prosecution. Moreover, in the event of 
related litigation with the government, the disclosure of such 
wrongdoing, even if done by third-party professionals, should serve as a 
mitigating factor when considering what penalties to assess against the 
corporation. This demonstrates how the relationship between regulators, 
corporate leaders, and professionals can and should be directed to foster 
an ethical, competitive corporate culture — not merely for regulators to 
 
 181. Cf. Harshbarger, supra note 98, at 221 (“Is it okay if we simply didn’t know what our 
clients were doing? Were we like the New York Stock Exchange Board—either we knew the facts 
and felt they were perfectly okay, or at least didn’t cross any legal boundary, or, on the other side, 
which is probably worse, did we not know or want to know what was occurring, and yet we took 
our fees?”). 
 182. See Richard M. Strassberg et al., Lawyers on Trial, 234 N.Y. L.J. 9 (2005). 
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punish all executives or for all corporations to see how they can skirt or 
otherwise evade the law.183 
V.  THE VALUE OF AN ETHICAL CULTURE 
The obvious question is whether our call for an ethical corporate 
culture is somehow disjointed from the typical concerns of a business. In 
this Article, we call for corporations to embrace a broader view of what 
it means to do business, including ethical governance. Is this prescription 
at odds with what it means to increase shareholder value? A variety of 
research indicates otherwise. 
An ethical culture simply makes good business sense. The problem, 
as we have outlined above, is not with “corporate governance,” as some 
narrowly define it. We are not interested in some ranking, a number 
tacked on after a ticker symbol — a number that may or may not mean 
anything.184 Instead, we are interested in a broad-based shift toward an 
ethical corporate culture: a shift that ultimately makes money. 
This might be intuitive:185 an ethical company is less likely to run 
 
 183. One major issue that corporations face in cooperating with regulators involves the waiver 
of attorney-client privilege. Specifically, corporations that turn over certain documents to regulators 
are often deemed to have waived the privilege, even when “limited waiver” agreements exist; every 
court except the Eighth Circuit has rejected such arrangements, arguing that any disclosure, even to 
a regulator, waives the privilege. See Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 607, 611 (8th 
Cir. 1978) (recognizing limited waiver); but see In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 
1192-1193 (10th Cir. 2006) (rejecting selective waiver); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 
1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same). In the federal courts, questions of privilege are governed by 
federal common law. See FED. R. EVID. 501. We support the proposed Rule 502, which would allow 
for limited waiver. Under this scenario, companies could disclose information to regulators, work to 
solve what problems exist, but be permitted to assert the privilege as to those documents and those 
subjects in litigation against private plaintiffs. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE SUBMITTED FOR PUBLIC COMMENT, A SUMMARY FOR BENCH AND BAR (August 2006), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Brochure_2006.pdf; Report from Hon. Jerry E. Smith, 
Chair, Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure (June 30, 2006), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Excerpt_EV_Report_Pub.pdf. 
  We of course understand (particularly as one of us has taught legal ethics for decades) that 
these issues, involving lawyers’ duties and obligations, are complex; we do not try to do the topic 
justice here. It is, nonetheless, a critical part of the new reality, and professionals must do more than 
use their duties as a shield. There are affirmative obligations, as well as opportunities, for lawyers, 
accountants, auditors, and others to offer real, independent, and strategic advice. These 
professionals, as always, play an integral role in the reform we envision. 
 184. See, e.g., Corporate Governance by the Numbers: It Doesn’t Work, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Sept. 22, 2004, available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
article/1041.cfm. 
 185. Or it might not. If the costs of crime — the magnitude of punishment times the odds of 
getting caught — are low, then crime does pay, and either the costs, odds, or both would need to be 
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into financial, accounting, or legal trouble. Less trouble means lower 
costs associated with trouble; lower costs mean more profits in the long 
run. But this is not just armchair philosophy; good ethics can mean more 
money in the short run as well. GovernanceMetrics International (GMI) 
recently examined governance practices at 3,220 companies 
worldwide.186 The companies that received GMI’s highest rating 
outperformed the S&P 500 by an average of over 11% for the 12 months 
ending February 28, 2005.187 
GMI’s study offers more than just hindsight. For example, Krispy 
Kreme recently lost 81% of its value after its accounting practices came 
under scrutiny.188 After an investigation, a special committee of Krispy 
Kreme’s board of directors concluded that the company “failed to meet 
its accounting and financial reporting obligations to its shareholders and 
the public.”189 The committee attributed this failure directly to a 
“corporate culture driven by a narrowly focused goal of exceeded 
projected earnings by a penny each quarter.”190 How would GMI’s data 
have affected this failure of corporate ethics? “In June 2003, 
GovernanceMetrics gave Krispy Kreme relatively low marks for its 
[corporate governance] policies, raking it 4 out of 10 overall. Then, in 
January 2004, [GMI] dropped its rating to 2.5. In July, Krispy Kreme 
disclosed that securities regulators were investigating its accounting.”191 
Krispy Kreme’s accounting fraud was foreshadowed by GMI’s ratings. 
Another study similarly links good governance and shareholder 
value, finding that companies with strong shareholder rights yielded 
annual returns that were 8.5% higher than companies with weak 
shareholder rights.192 When discussing the study, one of the co-authors 
indicated surprise at the findings. “As a financial economist,” he said, “I 
expected important things like governance already reflected in stock 
prices and therefore wouldn’t see much of a difference. We found 
otherwise.”193 His comment is important for two reasons. First, it 
reinforces GMI’s conclusion that good governance yields returns for 
 
increased. 
 186. Gretchen Morgenson, Companies Behaving Badly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, § 3, at 1. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc., Krispy Kreme Announces Completion of Special 
Committee Investigation (Aug. 10, 2005), 
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=120929&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=741862&highlight. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Morgenson, supra note 186. 
 192. Gompers et al., supra note 5, at 109. 
 193. Studies Show Impact of Governance Practices, N.Y.S.E. NEWSLETTER, June 2003, 
available at http://www.nyse.com/content/articles/1054291475066.html (emphasis added). 
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shareholders. But it also represents a deeper point. Throughout this 
Article, we have argued that corporate leaders must see good governance 
as endogenous to the business process that is, as a normal part of doing 
business. Metrick essentially assumed that they already did — hence his 
intuition that governance practices would already be reflected in stock 
price.194 The fact that governance was not reflected in stock price 
confirms our argument: the empirical data indicate that neither business 
leaders nor investors are yet factoring governance into their business 
decisions.195 
Another example from 1999 demonstrates the positive relationship 
between good governance and financial success. The World Trade 
Organization’s meeting in Seattle, Washington, that year was besieged 
by protestors and collapsed in short order.196 Soon thereafter, many 
corporations’ stock prices took a hit.197 But that fate did not befall all 
companies equally.198 In industries known for environmental problems 
(such as energy, steel, and mining) and labor abuses (such as apparel, 
toys, and sporting goods), those companies with a reputation for social 
responsibility did better than those without.199 While the companies 
without such a reputation saw stock prices drop by an average of over 
3%, the companies with a reputation for social responsibility saw their 
prices decline only slightly.200 Along the same lines, a June 2003 article 
in the New York Stock Exchange Newsletter surveyed a variety of 
studies from markets around the world that all point to the same 
conclusion: good governance means good business.201 
And these financial benefits parallel similar legal benefits. A 
company with a strong ethical culture is less likely to lose a lawsuit or 
have to pay out millions in a settlement. Of course, some people will still 
file lawsuits primarily to harass a company, but when those situations 
come up a company can be relatively more secure knowing that it 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. Unlike, say, taxes, which we have discussed earlier. See supra note 73 and accompanying 
text. Note also that GMI’s data also indicates that corporate governance is currently treated as 
exogenous to the business process. Since GMI’s metric for Krispy Kreme was declining before 
stock price declined, we can infer that the elements of good governance were not already reflected 
in stock price, just as the Gompers study found. Gompers et al., supra note 5, at 146. In other words, 
the market is (at least in those examples) not acting on the governance information available to it. 
 196. Marguerite Rigoglioso, In Bad Times, It Pays to Be Good: A Reputation for CSR May 
Shied Companies From the Public’s Ire, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2005, at 14. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See supra note 193. 
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ensured independence, minimized conflicts of interest, and had its 
governance structures independently evaluated. In other words, the firm 
would have less to fear, since it had stayed ahead of the curve from the 
beginning and not simply waited until a crisis came along.202 
In short, an ethical, transparent culture is not only the right thing to 
do but also acts as a prophylactic that protects everyone, from CEOs and 
boards to employees, investors, and other stakeholders. Indeed, any 
company might (and often will) encounter unethical or even illegal 
conduct.  The key is to proactively discover these transgressions and to 
ensure that the isolated act does not become a pattern.  Expecting 
employees to identify and correct irregularities immediately, before the 
regulators and lawmakers find out, will foster a sense of openness. 
Executives in particular can rest assured that problems will be remedied. 
After all, it is nearly impossible for a single CEO to know everything 
that is happening or might happen in a huge conglomerate. An executive 
should be able to trust her employees to prevent and eliminate 
malfeasance and should get support from the board for setting such 
expectations. 
Finally, the example of Tyco indicates both the good and the bad 
about corporate reform. There, executives’ wrongdoing resulted in a 
drop in stock price of roughly 80%.203 However, an aggressive internal 
investigation pushed for civil and criminal suits against the wrongdoers 
and found no evidence of systemic fraud.204 As a show of good faith, the 
company replaced all of its senior executives and instituted a 
comprehensive ethical program.205 On the one hand, this illustrates 
effective handling of a serious problem through internal investigation, 
effective outside counsel, and cooperation with government regulators. 
On the other hand, these changes only came after Tyco was on the brink 
 
 202. Cf. U.S.S.G. § 8B2.1(b)(1) - (7) (outlining an ECEP).  See also FED. R. EVID. 501, supra 
note 183, annot. 502. Under limited-waiver agreements, companies that did detect, disclose, and 
remedy misconduct would be protected against private litigants. 
 203. Hiawatha Bray, Tyco to Cut Jobs, Consolidate Troubled Company is Hoping to Save 
$125M Annually, Trim $27B Debt load Tyco to Sell Buildings, Aircraft, Pay Debt, BOSTON GLOBE, 
June 14, 2002, at D1. 
 204. See generally Brooke A. Masters, Tyco Finds $1.3 Billion in Accounting Errors, WASH. 
POST, May 1, 2003, at E04. 
 205. See generally Tyco Fraud InfoCenter, http://www.tycofraudinfocenter.com/ 
information.php (last visited July 14, 2005). See also DAVID BOIES, COURTING JUSTICE 235, 467 
(2004) (describing the proactive role his firm took in representing Tyco, voluntarily disclosing 
wrongdoing to the government and fully cooperating with government investigations). Boies and his 
firm did come under fire for declaring Tyco “clean” before all of the malfeasance was uncovered. 
See Floyd Norris, Joy for Tyco’s New Boss, Not for Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2003, at C1; 
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Tyco Inquiry Mostly Clears Its Accounting, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2002, at C4. 
Again, the important role that professionals play is clear. 
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of destruction. The puzzle for the future is determining how to get Tyco-
style reforms without a Tyco-style crisis. 
VI.  THE IMPORTANCE OF SITUATION 
In trying to solve that puzzle, there is one important fact to keep in 
mind. As described above,206 none (or at least nearly none) of the now-
disgraced CEOs set out to defraud people or do evil. Instead, “they 
started down the slippery slope when they felt the pressure from adverse 
results — declining sales, unexpected adverse rulings by a regulator, etc. 
— and they began to realize that the expectations that they had 
created . . . could not be met. So they thought it okay to fudge a little. . . . 
Then, as the business conditions worsened, they succumbed to the 
temptation to fudge more and pretty soon they understood that they were 
engaged in significant wrongdoing.”207 
These pressures, these temptations, are what Professor Hanson and 
his co-authors have described as situational forces.208 They have written 
extensively on the subject of situationism and have articles (both 
published and forthcoming) on situationism in corporate law.209 While it 
is not our intention to delve into an extensive situational analysis of 
corporate governance here, it is worth noting that the issues we raise 
intersect with work on situationism at a variety of levels. At the most 
basic level, we call for business leaders and regulators working 
collaboratively to create the situational forces to align incentives in such 
a way that fosters ethical conduct. 
Until we do so, and until we abandon the myopic “rational actor 
model,” our policy prescriptions are doomed to fail. Consider the issue 
of executive pay. It was originally thought that CEOs should be paid a 
bonus to foster proper conduct: if the company did poorly, the executive 
would not receive a bonus, so the incentive would be to improve 
performance. Yet problems continued. Then, boards hit on the idea of 
stock options: by making executives also shareholders, they would 
internalize any costs they were previously externalizing on the company. 
But stock options were not a silver bullet either, because CEOs were too 
often tempted to boost short-term value while disregarding long-term 
prosperity. Thus, boards instituted restricted stock options, for example, 
those that would only vest after five or ten years. 
 
 206. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text. 
 207. Nicolai, supra note 31. 
 208. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 209. Id. 
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At every turn, the assumption was that CEOs were solely “profit 
maximizing,” just as the traditional economic rational actor model would 
predict; however, a situational analysis would recognize the wider range 
of forces that affect CEOs. Of course money matters, but so does 
reputation. So does social standing, and so does respect from peers.210 
Money is a metric of that performance, but it is not the only metric. 
Many of the problems regarding CEO pay stem from this fundamental 
blindness. Indeed, increasing equity compensation is positively 
correlated with risk of earnings restatements.211 Clearly, the current 
system is not working. 
Blindness to situation also explains why the nature of corporate 
governance reforms often turns out to be illusory. If reform were truly 
successful, then one would predict a significant reduction in corporate 
malfeasance after SOX. Yet stories of corporate misconduct have 
continued unabated. Why? 
Again, the answer turns on situational blindness. Commentators on 
this subject have tended to view any misconduct as the work of a few 
“bad apples.” When we see more misconduct, we assume that there are 
simply more bad apples than there were earlier.212 The bigger question is 
rarely asked: what situation made this misconduct possible? We miss the 
orchard for the apples. When we do so, we forget that “bad apples are 
made, not born.”213 
Our prescriptions in this paper call for more situational awareness 
— to take a look at the orchard. If policymakers and business leaders do 
not address the situational causes of misconduct, it is a near guarantee 
that there will be more misconduct in the future. It is only by 
recognizing that situation matters that we can begin to take control of 
that situation and harness it for positive change. 
As the WorldCom example shows,214 the market’s situational 
pressures can be a tremendous force that drives companies to engage in 
 
 210. Cf. Joann S. Lublin, Creative Compensation Tactics Help Forge a Company’s Culture, 
Wall St. J. Online, April 17, 2006, http://www.careerjournal.com/salaryhiring/hotissues/20060417-
lublin.html. The company’s president does not reward his employees with more money, which the 
traditional economic model would suggest is all that matters. Instead, he rewards them with an 
“experience,” such as being rich for an evening: getting picked up in a limousine, going to an 
expensive restaurant, and so on. Id. He believes, rightly, that these experiences are more memorable 
than a direct-deposited bonus. Id. The example illustrates yet another way in which people are not 
solely “wealth-maximizing.” 
 211. See supra notes 154-61, 164 and accompanying text. 
 212. Chen & Hanson, supra note 6, at n.285. 
 213. Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Op-Ed., Cleaning Up the Corruption in Business 
and Politics, BOSTON GLOBE, June 1, 2006, at A11. 
 214. See Belson, supra note 13; supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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conduct that harms customers, employees, and shareholders. While the 
market forces companies to “keep up” with their malfeasant competitor, 
policy can foster countervailing situational forces. Indeed, if companies 
know that a malfeasant competitor will be held to account, then not only 
are the incentives to engage in malfeasance lowered, the incentives to 
match that competitor’s conduct are also reduced. 
One way to accomplish this, in addition to the statutory revisions 
we suggest above and the policy prescriptions we list below, is to 
incorporate elements of truly independent oversight. Across industries, 
countries, and sectors, the lesson is the same: when stakes get large 
enough, the likelihood of ethical and legal misconduct increases.215 In 
recent years, we have seen this misconduct in the corporate world, in 
corrections facilities,216 in sports,217 in religious institutions,218 in 
campaign finance,219 and at the United Nations.220 In situations like this, 
only real, independent oversight has the possibility of creating the right 
incentives; anything less will provide the illusion of reform, and perhaps 
even comfort, but it will not change the underlying situation. 
To some extent, companies recognize the importance of situational 
pressures. For example, as discussed before, the Thompson Memo did 
not, by its terms, require companies to waive the attorney-client 
privilege or cut off employees’ legal fees.221 However, the pressures on 
 
 215. See, e.g., E-mail from Frank A. Nicolai to Scott Harshbarger, Senior Counsel to the Firm, 
Proskauer Rose LLP (Jan. 16, 2006, 11:04 EDT) (on file with authors) (noting that “when the stakes 
get large enough,” there is a heightened need for vigilance as fraud is more likely to occur). 
 216. See., e.g., GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON CORR. REFORM, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., 
STRENGTHENING PUBLIC SAFETY, INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY, AND INSTITUTING FISCAL 
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION (2004), available at http://www.mass.gov/ 
Eeops/docs/eops/GovCommission_Corrections_Reform.pdf (Scott Harshbarger, Chairman). 
 217. See, e.g., Stephen Cannella, Due Process on the Hill, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 11, 
2005, 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2005/writers/stephen_cannella/03/11/steroids.congress/index.html 
(discussing the steroids scandal in Major League Baseball and the failure of league to address the 
problem). 
 218. See, e.g., CatholiCity, Catholic Commentary on the Scandals in the Church, 
http://www.catholicity.com/scandals.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2005). 
 219. See, e.g., Susan Schmidt et al., Investigating Abramoff—Special Report, WASH. POST, 
June 22, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
linkset/2005/06/22/LI2005062200936.html (discussing the Jack Abramoff lobbying scandal). 
 220. See, e.g., Colum Lynch, Oil-for-Food Panel Rebukes Annan, Cites Corruption, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 8, 2005, at A01 (describing corruption at the highest reaches of the UN relating to the 
Oil-for-Food program). 
 221. Cf. Brad D. Brian, Corporate Responsibility: The Lawyer’s Role, 32 LITIG. 1, 62 (Spring 
2006) (noting that the waiver provision in the Thompson memo is “stated as a narrow exception”). 
We believe that waiver should be treated as a narrow exception and take no issue with the memo 
itself; we do, however, believe that some prosecutorial tactics may have crossed the line. See also 
United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d. 330, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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them may be so great that the “choice” they face is not a choice in the 
usual sense at all; prosecutors’ heavy-handed tactics put companies in a 
situation where they have no meaningful option to refuse.222 But the idea 
we are discussing and that Hanson has written about is not like an item 
in a buffet, to be drawn from when the fancy strikes. Situational forces 
affect all of us, regulators and corporations alike, at all times. Just as the 
“choice” to waive the privilege may not be truly free, so too do pressures 
induce prosecutors to bring marginal cases or transgress ethical 
boundaries in their tactics.223 These poor decisions, we believe, are the 
result of the overly-antagonistic environment we described earlier.224 
Obviously, those who committed crimes — the real bad apples — 
should be held to account. But Enron, WorldCom, AIG, and the others 
should not become scapegoats, and our policies should recognize a 
critical fact: that situation matters. 
VII.  MOVING FORWARD 
So situation matters. How, then, can we — regulators, business 
leaders, and citizens — work to change that situation? Here, we propose 
a series of remedies that detail the points outlined at the start of this 
Article. It is important to remember, however, that this is not a problem 
that any one group could (or should) solve by itself; instead, forging a 
new, ethical corporate culture requires a concerted effort from several 
different groups. 
These prescriptions are very specific at some points, but the ideas 
motivating the suggestions are applicable in a variety of contexts; the 
push toward greater transparency, accountability and ethics is not limited 
to any one sector. After Enron and WorldCom, the initial focus was on 
large, publicly traded corporations. Today’s new reality has affected 
accounting firms, investment banks, and mutual funds. Hedge funds and 
 
 222. Cf. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d. at 363. 
 223. Interestingly, as Chen and Hanson point out, corporate law scholars (and corporations 
generally) invest a lot of time and money in promoting the idea that consumers are rational 
choosers, not moved by their situation. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 6. Yet in this context, 
corporations are arguing precisely that their choices are constrained by situational forces. Indeed, 
Judge Kaplan characterized prosecutors’ tactics as a “proverbial gun to the head.” Stein¸ 435 F. 
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might involve such situational constraints. One would think, though, that what’s good for the goose 
is good for the gander: if consumers are dispositionist choosers, then why can corporations not 
simply choose according to their preferences when faced with prosecutors’ requests? Of course, we 
do not believe that both corporations and consumers are capable of avoiding situational pressures; 
instead, we argue that both of them (and indeed all of us) are situational characters, again 
emphasizing the importance of situational forces, in corporate law as generally. 
 224. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text. 
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private equity firms are likely next in regulators’ sights as the once-
novel investment vehicles become increasingly mainstream;225 SEC 
Chairman Cox has pledged that the SEC will not back off of regulating 
hedge funds even though its old regulation was struck down.226 In short, 
this section outlines the kinds of changes that are needed if we are to 
foster a climate of corporate integrity. 
A.  Business Leaders 
First and foremost, business leaders must see this as a window of 
opportunity and not a threat. Instead of instinctively opposing any 
attempt at regulation, directors and officers should offer their own 
suggestions for good governance and stay ahead of the curve. As 
described earlier, this will pay off, literally, in the marketplace.227 But it 
will also demonstrate that companies are willing to be critical of 
themselves and each other, and this will provide regulators with an 
incentive to focus only on the low-hanging fruit mentioned earlier. 
Indeed, the FSGOs make explicit provisions for “downward departures” 
if companies have effective compliance and ethics programs as well as if 
they self-report wrongdoing, cooperate with authorities, and accept 
responsibility.228 The simplest way for companies to improve their 
corporate culture is to adopt best practices from the private, public, and 
nonprofit sectors: independent and empowered boards, regular 
governance audits, checks and balances, accountability for principals, 
and so on.229 
This will involve a learning curve as CEOs and boards of directors 
 
 225. The “mainstreaming” of hedge funds is perhaps best evidenced by the fact that the largest 
hedge fund manager is no longer some exotic boutique but Goldman, Sachs, & Co. See Alistair 
Barr, Goldman is Now World’s Largest Hedge Fund Manager, MARKETWATCH, June 21, 2006, 
available at http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?guid=%7BE72DC62B-E5C7-
4C92-91C6-1400725AC835%7D. 
 226. See Testimony Concerning the Regulation of Hedge Funds: Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Christopher Cox, 
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission) (indicating that regulation of hedge funds before 
the now-struck rule was “inadequate” and now, after the rule’s rejection, “that is once again the 
case”). Cox went on to say that the SEC would “promulgate a new antifraud rule under § 206(4) of 
the Investment Advisers Act that would have the effect of ‘looking through’ a hedge fund to its 
investors” (instead of counting an LLC as one client, the change would count each investor in the 
LLC as a client) in order to clarify the fiduciary duties and obligations that the fund has. Id. 
 227. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text. 
 228. See USSG §§ 8C2.5(f) - (g). 
 229. See, e.g., Pablo Eisenberg, Philanthropy Must Challenge Corporate America, CHRON. 
PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 18, 2005, available at http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/ 
aboutus/media/ChroniclePhilanthropy_challenge.html. 
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come to acquire the knowledge, skill, and attitude to make ethics an 
integral part of corporate culture. Over time the practices in place will be 
continually evaluated, modified, and revised.230 At every step of the 
way, as they innovate toward this end, business leaders should hold 
themselves out as models for others to emulate. 
A few years ago, companies laid off employees in a race to the 
bottom, trying to match WorldCom’s fictional profits.231 This is the 
pitfall of being ethical in a competitive market: the pressures of 
competition are so severe that well-meaning companies find themselves 
forced to keep pace with the malfeasant competitor or suffer losses.232 
Next time, we can make the opposite of the WorldCom story happen: if 
the well-intentioned CEO knows that regulators will hold its competitor 
accountable, the market incentives are not for the ethical company to 
lower its standards, but instead, for the malfeasant company to raise its 
standards. This illustrates two points: first, if regulation properly aligns 
incentives, market forces can do the rest.233 Second, a strong regulatory 
baseline is absolutely essential to turn a “race to the bottom” into a “race 
to the top.” Indeed, only such a baseline can provide business leaders 
with the protection they need to be ethical in a competitive market. 
The most important thing companies can do is to have clear ethical 
standards in place that actively foster a culture of compliance with the 
letter and spirit of laws. The FSGOs suggest as much and provide a 
seven-point plan that, if met, would be sufficient to qualify for a 
downward departure at sentencing.234 However, the FSGOs are only one 
part of a larger picture. Indeed, if the guidelines were all that were 
needed, every organization would be in perfect compliance since they 
would always want to protect against more severe sentences. Instead, as 
the ACC’s paper indicates, the FSGOs have been taken by many as the 
starting point for a needed dialogue between business and government 
leaders.235 In the meantime, business leaders must indicate to everyone 
in their firms, from the CEO and board to day-to-day managers and 
operators, that a transparent, ethical culture and not just mere 
compliance with the law is a priority for the company and its long-term 
planning. 
 
 230. And corporations are best-situated to make these types of modifications, since the 
information costs are prohibitively high for the government. 
 231. See Belson, supra note 13. 
 232. See generally Chen & Hanson, supra note 6 (describing the influence of situational forces 
on corporations). 
 233. Cf. id. 
 234. USSG § 8B2.1(b)(1) - (7). 
 235. See supra note 47. 
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The recent scandal at H.P. over “pretexting” illustrates the point 
that ethical considerations are important over and above legal 
considerations. In investigating boardroom leaks, H.P. resorted to 
practices of questionable legality.236 Although “the company’s lawyers 
had concluded pretexting was legal, . . . the documents and memos sent 
between the lawyers and detectives show that they had not given much 
consideration as to whether it was ethical.”237 When two investigators 
did raise ethical concerns, they were not taken as seriously as they 
should have been.238 This type of mentality is precisely that which we 
seek to change when we call for a broad-based shift in corporate culture. 
These changes cannot be all talk; after all, Enron had an ethics 
manual that was half an inch thick.239 Business leaders must follow up 
with concrete steps to show that they are putting their money where their 
mouths are. We want “pay for performance” for our public school 
teachers, so why not our CEOs? In a relatively recent example, John 
Mack, the new CEO of Morgan Stanley, said that he will forego 
guaranteed compensation of $25 million and instead receive pay based 
on the company’s performance.240 Such a move is a step in the right 
direction, and Morgan Stanley should be commended. But it should also 
be vocal and emphatic in underscoring its emphasis on accountability 
and increase pressure on its competitors to do likewise. Simultaneously, 
Morgan Stanley’s board should hold Mack accountable. We have 
proposed a legal reform that would strengthen SOX’s clawback 
provisions,241 but if the board were serious about pay for performance it 
should have written even stronger provisions into Mack’s contract. 
Additionally, companies should ensure that boards are truly 
engaged and independent. Donn Vickrey, a founder of Camelback 
Research, argues that many companies simply state that their directors 
are independent without demonstrating how — and worse, without 
recognizing glaring conflicts of interest.242 He points to one example 
where a health care concern’s founder invested his money through an 
 
 236. Darlin, supra note 24. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Harry Hurt III, Drop That Ledger! This is the Compliance Officer, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 
2005, § 3, at 5. 
 240. CNNMoney.com, Morgan Stanley CEO Shuns Pay Guarantee, 
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 241. See supra Part IVB. 
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investment firm, founded by one of the directors that invested in health 
care concerns.243 In another case, a person was used to conduct an 
outside audit of a company.244 That same auditor was later hired as a 
director to chair the audit committee — a position in which he had to 
review the adequacy of his own earlier inquiry!245 
A common reply from businesses is that independent boards are not 
sufficiently knowledgeable about the goings-on of a firm to make 
informed decisions.246 However, independence does not mean ignorance; 
companies can and should seek out directors who have relevant 
business, financial, or legal experience.247 Such directors can be found 
without resorting to the conflicts of interest and self-dealing described 
earlier. Again, this makes good business sense: Korean firms with 
independent directors making up at least half of their board had a 20% 
higher share price.248 Shareholders benefit in other ways as well. CEOs 
were more likely to get “lucky grants” — those that were most likely the 
result of backdating — when the board lacked a majority of independent 
directors, and outside directors were more likely to receive “lucky” 
grants when there were entrenchment arrangements in place that 
protected them from removal.249 The message is clear: independent 
directors can add checks and balances without sacrificing expertise, all 
while improving the company’s bottom line. 
There are, of course, many other steps that can be taken. Companies 
should engage independent law firms to conduct regular audits of 
governance practices. Boards of directors should aggressively pursue 
clawbacks from malfeasant executives, perhaps even more aggressive 
than the 150% formula we suggested earlier.250 Lawyers, accountants, 
and other professionals should report malfeasance as high up in the 
organization as possible — directly to the board if necessary — and be 
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 246. See, e.g., Letter from David Gladstone, Chairman, National Association of Business 
Development Companies, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission 
(Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304/s70304-15.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2005). 
 247. Cf. Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: 
Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DUKE. L.J. 517, 563 
(2003) (pointing out “that the selection of one director with financial expertise may offer more 
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 248. See supra note 192. 
 249. See Bebchuk, Inside Jobs, supra note 162. 
 250. See supra Section IVB. 
47
Harshbarger and Jois: Looking Back and Looking Forward
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
HARSHBARGER & JOIS 3/26/2007  12:05:05 PM 
48 AKRON LAW REVIEW [40:1 
permitted to make confidential, anonymous reports to the government if 
there are no satisfactory responses.251 
B.  Regulators 
For their part, regulators must ensure that prosecution and 
enforcement do not become ends in themselves. Particularly in the 
marketplace, laws must be enforced to foster competition and efficiency, 
not just for the sake of prosecuting. In this spirit, regulators should offer 
an “amnesty” period to companies that disclose knowledge of 
malfeasance within a reasonable amount of time, allowing companies 
enough time to investigate and address shortcomings.252 In exchange for 
implementation of good faith measures to remedy these shortcomings, 
the SEC, Attorneys-General, and other regulators should agree not to 
prosecute these companies. To the extent possible, they should enter into 
limited-waiver and confidentiality agreements to ensure that privileged 
material disclosed to the government will not be available to private 
plaintiffs. When private litigation commences, the regulators should 
assert their own privilege over the corporate documents; in anticipation 
of private litigation, regulators should contract with the corporation to 
affirm that they will vigorously assert the privilege. Even if the firms 
subjected themselves to stock losses and potential lawsuits from private 
citizens upon disclosing, the costs would not be nearly as high as if they 
allowed problems to fester and explode at some point in the future. Even 
if the “market costs” (loss of shareholder value and lawsuits) were 
exactly the same, the company would still be better off without the threat 
of government prosecution and multi-million (or billion) dollar 
settlements because “[t]oday, more than ever, securities class action 
cases are more expensive to resolve and take longer to close.”253 
Regulators must capitalize on this cooperation by being flexible 
 
 251. See supra Section IVC. Regulators could receive this information in anonymous or 
aggregate form.  The evidence, if any, of wrongdoing could be inadmissible in court, thus ensuring 
that, for practical purposes, the information is treated as confidential.  Attorney disclosure in this 
context should not be held to be a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, an issue that can be 
clarified through judicial determination or proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502.  In any event, 
even setting this aside, from a purely public relations perspective, there is no rationale for not 
disclosing to the highest level possible. 
 252. Cf. Thompson Memo, supra note 59, at § VI B (discussing amnesty in antitrust cases).  
The Thompson Memo also describes the mitigating effect of a corporation’s “timely and voluntary 
disclosure of wrongdoing” in determining whether to bring charges against a corporation. Id. 
 253. Carol A.N. Zacharias, Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation and Directors and 
Officers Liability Insurance, 20 JOHN LINER REV. 1, 14 (Summer 2006), available at 
http://www.ace-ina.com/docs/JLR_Summer_2006.pdf. 
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when the need arises. One of the frequently heard criticisms of SOX is 
that it imposes undue costs on small and mid-sized firms.254 The same 
compliance program that works for a Fortune 500 company would be ill-
fitting for a small-cap firm that cannot afford to spend two or three 
percent of revenues on compliance. Thus, regulators should allow 
different-sized firms in different industries to determine on their own 
means to achieve the policy goals behind SOX, FSGO, or any other 
regulatory scheme. We have outlined one way that this could happen: by 
reforming Section 404 requirements for non-accelerated filers.255 This is, 
however, just one example of the type of flexibility that might be 
appropriate. 
The SEC recently released suggested policy modifications for small 
companies, certain foreign investors, and newly public companies.256 
The Commission proposes extending the date by which non-accelerated 
filers must start providing a report by management assessing the 
effectiveness of the company’s internal control over financial reporting; 
the compliance date would be extended by about 6 months.257 The SEC 
also proposed extending the date by which non-accelerated filers must 
begin to comply with the Section 404(b) requirement to provide an 
auditor’s attestation report on internal control over financial reporting in 
their annual reports to fiscal years ending after December, 2008.258 
Finally, the SEC relaxed Section 404 requirements for small 
companies.259 This example shows that the SEC is, at a minimum, 
willing to accommodate some of the issues smaller companies face. 
The ACC’s letter describes another possibility of regulatory 
flexibility. Recall that the FSGOs require companies to report evidence 
of wrongdoing to the government within a reasonable time.260 The ACC 
instead recommends that the company either report such wrongdoing or 
develop and implement modifications to the company’s practices to 
remedy the situation.261 We pointed out earlier that this might provide an 
incentive to cover up fraud, since the company would know that it could 
“get away” with not publicizing its wrongdoing. Thus, we prefer a 
 
 254. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra Section IVA. 
 256. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Offers Further Relief 
from Section 404 Compliance for Smaller Public Companies and Many Foreign Private Issuers 
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 260. USSG § 8C2.5(f)(2). 
 261. ACC Letter, supra note 52, at 12. 
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middle ground between the existing FSGO provision and the ACC 
recommendation. Companies should have to abide by the FSGO 
provision or report actual wrongdoing, not merely evidence of 
wrongdoing, within one year and make progress toward implementing 
new policies and procedures. This would give companies time to address 
the situation on their own, while mitigating the incentive to orchestrate a 
cover-up. Within parameters, companies should determine how best to 
implement the policy behind legislative and regulatory schemes, and 
regulators should be receptive to this. 
Another good example is still in progress as of this writing. A 
recent SEC rule requires companies to count stock options as an expense 
on their ledgers.262 We believe that this was the right decision, since 
options were liberally granted through the 1990s since companies did 
not have to consider these an expense. The new rule requires share-based 
compensation to be recognized as an expense based on fair value as of 
the grant date.263 However, this raises a follow-up question: what is an 
appropriate measure of “fair value”? We support the SEC’s attempt to 
“encourage[] . . . robust efforts in the private sector to design market 
instruments that have the potential to accurately measure the cost of 
employee stock option grants to the issuer.”264 
In response to the rule, a variety of private sector actors offered 
means to value stock options. Cisco Systems, for example, offered a plan 
under which companies could sell similar securities to institutional 
investors to value their employees’ options.265 Although the SEC 
rejected this particular plan, it kept open the possibility of other market-
based approaches and resisted using a “model-based” approach to value 
options.266 This provides yet another example of how a collaborative 
approach to addressing a problem is far more productive than a 
unilateral approach. Moreover, it shows how corporations can and 
should work within a regulatory baseline to find the best solutions. 
Corporations are market actors and market actors respond to market 
 
 262. See FIN. ACCOUNTING SERIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 123, app. 240 
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., revised 2004). 
 263. Id. at ii (Summary). 
 264. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement of Chairman Cox Regarding Use of 
Market Instruments in Valuing Employee Stock Options, SEC Release 2005-129 (Sept. 9, 2005), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-129.htm [hereinafter Cox Statement]; See FASB 
and SEC Guidance on Applying Statement 123R, DEFINING ISSUES (KPMG LLP, New York, N.Y.), 
Sept. 2005, available at http://www.us.kpmg.com/services/content.asp?l1id=30&l2id=730&cid= 
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 265. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, U.S. Rejects Cisco Plan on Options, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2005, 
at C1. 
 266. Cox Statement, supra note 264. 
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incentives.267 If regulators set out the proper incentives — amnesty, tax 
credits, and credible threats of prosecution for those who do violate the 
law — firms will figure out on their own the best way to achieve those 
incentives, as the FSGO and stock option examples indicate. We need 
strong regulation and effective laws on the books; in several respects, we 
have argued that SOX does not go far enough. We also believe that 
corporate crime must be prosecuted aggressively and that fines and 
penalties should be imposed to the fullest extent necessary. At the end of 
the day, we only believe that these are means to an end. Under the 
current regime, a combative atmosphere pervades business-government 
relations, so that the only incentives are for each side to vilify the other. 
Instead, laws and regulations should provide a framework within which 
market actors determine the most efficient way to build value and foster 
an ethical corporate environment. 
C. Citizens and Shareholders 
If there is one thing that firms understand, it is economics; firms 
supply what is in demand. If investors (institutional and retail) continue 
to press for an ethical corporate culture, and if regulators establish a 
strong baseline, firms will provide one. But investors must be willing to 
put their money where their mouths are. It’s easy to push for “good 
governance” when markets are doing poorly; poorly-governed firms, in 
the long run, cost investors money. But what about when stocks are 
rising? After all, institutional investors were not clamoring for more 
transparency and openness during the “Roaring ‘90s.” Blaming “poor 
governance” (indeed, blaming anything) is easy when times are tough; 
investors who truly value integrity will hold companies to account even 
when times are good. 
The study cited earlier indicated that governance is not already 
reflected in stock prices.268 But if investors internalize ethical 
governance into their decision-making — as, for example, the Yahoo! 
Finance profiles indicate — then, over time, we would expect 
governance to be reflected in stock price.269 This should give investors 
an incentive to call for good governance when times are good: if high 
stock prices already reflect governance, then preserving or improving 
those practices becomes more critical to preserving shareholder value; if 
already-high stock prices do not reflect governance (as the study cited 
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earlier demonstrates), then improving governance practices will enhance 
shareholder value even more. Of course, as the GMI story indicates, if 
governance is poor, then improving practices might stave off financial 
losses or even bankruptcy.270 
But an ethical corporate culture has to do with more than 
shareholder value. In a related context, we wrote that “[a]n ethical 
dilemma is not deciding whether to break the law. An ethical dilemma 
arises when principles collide within the bounds of the law.”271 
Similarly, an ethical dilemma for investors is not whether to lose money 
by investing in a poorly-governed company. An ethical dilemma arises 
when principles — shareholder value and governance — collide in the 
context of a well-performing company. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
In the broadest sense, an ethical corporate culture is built on the 
same foundations as our democracy: checks and balances, openness, and 
transparency. It is based on good business judgment and profitability; it 
depends on free markets and competition. It is also built on 
professionalism, with lawyers, accountants and investment managers 
giving objective, expert advice, not swayed to the greatest extent 
possible by personal biases. Indeed, much of the breakdown over the 
past few years has involved a dereliction of duty on the part of those 
who were supposed to be exercising independent judgment in the 
corporate world. Among other things, we are asking for those 
professionals to play their roles, and in so doing, to protect the business 
leaders who are their clients.272 
In a sense, our policy prescription is simple: regulators must align 
incentives to foster ethical conduct and to make it clearer when 
companies shirk this duty. Ever since Sarbanes-Oxley was passed, there 
have been those in the business community who have said that the 
regulatory response to corporate misconduct went too far and that 
markets should be allowed to work. Yet we have seen that markets, left 
to their own devices, create in some cases precisely the wrong 
incentives: options backdating, “pretexting” at HP, accounting 
misconduct, and more. Regulation allows the bad actors to be 
 
 270. See supra note 186. 
 271. Harshbarger & Jois, supra note 24, at 47. 
 272. When this judgment gets compromised, and there is no true independence between the 
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79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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sanctioned, but more than that, it helps turn around a race to the bottom. 
Over the past few years, institutions from the Catholic Church273 to 
Major League Baseball274 have been the subject of scandal and 
controversy. The recent corporate scandals are just the most recent of the 
governance crises that have gripped American leadership in many other 
ways, and surely there will always be a few bad apples in every barrel. 
Over the past several years, however, we have seen a systemic failure of 
ethical conduct in American firms. If the leaders of corporate America 
can rise to the challenge — can overcome this governance crisis, grow, 
and lead as a result — they may be the first to turn a failure of leadership 
into a success that benefits us all. 
 
 273. See CatholiCity, supra note 218. 
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questioning to police themselves.” Id. 
53
Harshbarger and Jois: Looking Back and Looking Forward
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
